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I. INTRODUCTION
Can a lawyer be disqualified from representation simply because
they have had an informal conversation with a former employee with
a non-disclosure agreement?  A few years ago,1 lead counsel for plain-
tiffs in a major class-action suit faced just such a threat.  A former
employee of the defendant corporation, not previously identified dur-
ing several years of discovery, contacted a journalist writing about the
case with important new information about wrongful acts taken by
the corporation.  The journalist passed the employee’s name to plain-
tiffs’ counsel and when counsel spoke with the former employee, star-
tling new information came to light.  A subsequent request for
documents related to the disclosure revealed to the defendant that
there was an undisclosed employee source of information about the
corporation, and defendant demanded the name of the former em-
ployee.  Upon discovering that the former employee had signed a non-
disclosure agreement (NDA), defendant claimed that the information
in question was confidential business information, that its disclosure
outside of formal discovery violated the NDA, and that counsel’s con-
duct was unethical.  In particular, counsel was alleged to have vio-
lated Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4,2 which prohibits using a
method of obtaining evidence that violates the rights of third parties,3
by interfering with the non-disclosure contract.  This claim of unethi-
cal conduct then formed the basis for a motion to disqualify counsel
from representation in this major class-action suit, a case that had
been pursued on a contingency basis for several years.
While vigorously opposing the disqualification on the merits at
considerable expense, counsel offered not to use the evidence revealed
by the former employee in order to avoid any suggestion of impropri-
ety.  There was no disqualification in the end, possibly because coun-
sel had asked about the possibility of an NDA and the former
employee had forgotten that any such agreement had been signed, but
it was quite a scare.  What if counsel had not asked, or the employee
had remembered?  Would counsel have been disqualified?  What if the
evidence given up had been central to the case?
1. The details of this skirmish are covered by a protective order and not publicly
available, however, I am personally familiar with the facts through my participa-
tion in the case as a legal expert.  The facts in the actual case have been simpli-
fied and modified for this Article.
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2009).  The Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, which are published by the American Bar Association, will here-
inafter be referred to as the “Model Rules.”
3. Id.
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With employer use of non-disclosure agreements proliferating, the
threat of an ethics violation, loss of evidence, and disqualification
could well be enough to discourage lawyers from engaging in informal
discovery with any former employees, because they may be known to
have signed an NDA, others because they merely might have signed
such an agreement.  However, is there really any possibility that it is
unethical to informally communicate with a former employee with an
NDA, known or unknown, and could this possibly justify disqualifica-
tion anyway?  Since Model Rule 4.4 only makes conduct that violates
the rights of third parties unethical, the legitimacy of such conduct
will depend on whether it violates the substantive law of contract and
tort.  This “piggybacking” of ethical rules on substantive law is wide-
spread in the Model Rules and, ordinarily, it is both efficient and effec-
tive to make ethical standards rest upon substantive law.4  However,
when substantive law is itself both unsettled and controversial, this
technique creates what I call an “ethical rabbit hole, a long and tan-
gled detour into the law producing an uncertain answer.”5  That is
precisely the situation created by the scenario I have just described.
Whether or not a lawyer can be found to have acted unethically in
violation of Model Rule 4.4 initially depends upon whether the lawyer
would be liable for intentional interference with the NDA between the
former employee and their employer.  In part, this is a matter of tort
law, and in Part I of this Article, published separately at 89 NEB. L.
REV. (forthcoming June 2011), I evaluated the possible application of
this quite complex tort to a lawyer’s informal communication with
such a former employee for the purpose of obtaining information rele-
vant to proposed or pending litigation.  What emerged from this evalu-
ation was a sense that only in a few jurisdictions and with the best
facts could we have confidence that a lawyer would not be liable for
intentional interference with contract as a matter of tort law.6  How-
ever, since a breach of an enforceable contract is required before any
tort liability can attach, this ethical rabbit hole also includes a detour
through contract law as well.
In this second part of the Article, I consider the likelihood that an
employee NDA would be interpreted to cover various kinds of informa-
tion that might be relevant to litigation.  While the scope of coverage
depends initially upon the language of the agreement, there are good
arguments to suggest that various public policy considerations could
limit the enforceability of NDAs in this context.  However, courts have
thus far had limited opportunities to evaluate the public policy impli-
4. See Maura I. Strassberg, An Ethical Rabbit Hole: Model Rule 4.4, Intentional
Interference with Former Employee Non-Disclosure Agreements and the Threats of
Disqualification, 89 NEB. L. REV. 923 (2011).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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cations of NDAs used to block informal discovery, and what results
there are have been quite mixed.7  As a result, it is almost impossible
to predict in advance whether a particular NDA will be found to be
unenforceable.
With the possibility that some NDA contracts might be found both
enforceable and breached in this scenario, the question of whether a
lawyer’s connection to such a breach is unethical moves from the
arena of substantive law to ethics itself.  If tort and contract law actu-
ally does extend this far, at least in some jurisdictions, should we em-
brace the limits thereby imposed on lawyers and make them our own?
If we do rubberstamp such tort law in the ethical rules, it provides
opposing counsel with a very simple and potent threat.  Without op-
posing counsel ever actually litigating either the tortiousness of the
conduct or the enforceability of the contract, and without ever making
an ethical complaint, the opposing party can move to disqualify the
lawyer on the mere possibility that a lawyer may have violated Model
Rule 4.4(a).8  This threat so immediately threatens the pocketbook of
lawyers and clients9 that it may in fact create more deterrence than
either the threat of tort liability or the threat of discipline.  The threat
of tort liability is remote in time, expensive for the other side to pur-
sue, and might be covered by malpractice insurance.  The threat of
discipline is even more remote as opposing counsel can not get a stra-
tegic benefit from any possible discipline and likely suffers from the
bar-wide reluctance to report possible ethical violations.  Thus, with-
out a deliberate decision as to whether we do indeed want to deter
such conduct by litigation counsel, the Model Rules could be under-
stood to have handed opposing counsel a weapon capable of producing
a serious chill in litigation investigations,10 or, at the very least,
greatly increasing the cost of litigation by shifting informal investiga-
tion to formal discovery.  In the final section of this Article, I consider
the history, purpose, and interpretation of Model Rule 4.4, and con-
clude that there are good reasons for excluding conduct of this kind
from the reach of the rule.
7. See infra subsection I.B.1.b.
8. See Susan Becker, Discovery of Information and Documents from a Litigant’s For-
mer Employees: Synergy and Synthesis of Civil Rules, Ethical Standards, Privi-
lege Doctrines, and Common Law Principles, 81 NEB. L. REV 868, 981 (2003)
(noting the threat of ethical violation and trial sanction when former employees
with confidentiality agreements are contacted ex parte).
9. See, e.g., Davidson Supply Co. v. P.P.E., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 956, 958 (D. Md 1997)
(noting that motions to disqualify “cause tremendous disruption to the orderly
handling of the case (not to mention the expenditure of time and money on mat-
ters ancillary to the merits)”).
10. See Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 441, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(“agreements calling or appearing to call for silence concerning matters relevant
to alleged legal violations, whether or not such agreements are sought to be en-
forced, inherently chill communication relevant to the litigation”).
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II. BREACH OF THE NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT
Judicial determination that a breach of contract occurred is a pre-
requisite for a finding of tortious interference with such a contract.11
As a practical matter, however, interference with the contract will oc-
cur before any judicial determination that the interference caused a
breach of contract.  Since tort liability does not require our potentially
interfering lawyer to have subjectively realized that a breach would
occur,12 our lawyer may well bear the risk of an inaccurate prediction
about breach.  This will be enough to discourage some lawyers from
engaging in informal discovery of former employees and persuade
those already threatened with disqualification to agree not to use such
information without putting the claimed breach of the NDA to a rigor-
ous test.  The goal of this next section is to provide the rigorous test
that lawyers often feel they cannot afford to do by assessing the possi-
ble strength of the underlying breach of contract claims.  To the extent
that the assumed strength of these claims turns out to be exaggerated,
we may question the desirability of allowing Model Rule 4.4 to perpet-
uate this chilling effect.
A. Lack of Consideration
The presence of consideration for an NDA will depend entirely
upon the particular circumstances under which the NDA has been
signed by the employee.  The NDA may be signed at the beginning of
employment, and when this is the case, it will be viewed as supported
by the promise of future employment.13  Similarly, as NDAs signed at
11. See Goldner v. Sullivan, Gough, Skipworth, Summers & Smith, 105 A.D.2d 1149,
1150 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (dismissing as “premature” a tortious interference
claim against insurance company attorneys who had advised non-payment of
claims due to evidence of arson when issue of whether insurance companies
breached by refusing to pay was not yet determined).
12. The lawyer need only know the facts that subsequently support the court’s legal
conclusion of breach.  Don King Prods., Inc., v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 741, 775–76
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that the law of intentional interference makes knowledge
of the existence of the contract rather than knowledge of the validity of the con-
tract sufficient); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. i (1979) (indicating
that a mistaken belief about the legal effect of a contract provides no excuse).
This forces potential interferers to take the risk of being wrong about both
whether the contract will be valid and binding and whether their conduct will be
a breach.
13. E.g., Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 185 Cal. App. 3d 438, 448 (4th Dist. 1986) (noting that
future employment was consideration for NDA when signed at orientation for
new employees); Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez, 175 P.3d 899, 903 (Mont.
2008) (“Consideration exists if the employee enters into the non-compete agree-
ment at the time of hiring.”). But see National Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, 323
N. W. 2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1982) (stating that when employees are not informed of
non-compete at hiring, but required to sign one shortly after beginning work,
there is no consideration); George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O’Brien, 347 A.2d 311, 316
(Pa. 1975) (holding that when oral employment contract is entered into prior to
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the end of employment are usually in exchange for severance pay and/
or extended benefits, consideration would also normally be present
under these circumstances of formation.  However, in some cases, the
NDA is signed in the middle of employment.  Continued employment
after such signing is sufficient consideration for the NDA in some ju-
risdictions,14 but in others consideration will only be found if the NDA
was signed in exchange for a change in the employee’s conditions of
employment, such as a raise, a promotion, or access to confidential
information.15  If the NDA was requested merely as an afterthought,
or because of a change of policy, it will be found to lack considera-
tion.16  There is some variance, however, in how tight courts require
beginning work and employee learns only when employment starts that they
must sign a non-compete, it is without consideration).
14. E.g., Research & Trading Corp. v. Powell, 468 A.2d 1301, 1305 (Del. Ch. 1983)
(holding that continued employment is consideration for post-employment NDA
when employment is at will and employee must sign or be fired); Farm Bureau
Serv. Co. of Maynard v. Kohls, 203 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 1972) (finding consid-
eration in continued employment when non-compete signed two months after em-
ployment began); Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Richter, 657 P.2d 589, 592 (Ks. Ct.
App. 1983) (consideration found where employee was told both that “continued
employment was conditioned upon execution of the hiring agreement” and “re-
tained, promoted and entrusted with company secrets for a significant time after
execution”); Lake Land Emp. Group of Akron, LLC v. Columber, 804 N.E.2d 27,
32 (Ohio 2004) (holding that consideration is present when a post-employment
non-compete is followed by continued employment of an at-will employee); Mat-
lock v. Data Processing Secur., Inc., 607 S.W.2d 946 (Tx. App. 1980) (post-employ-
ment non-compete supported by consideration of continued employment).
15. E.g,, Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 N.W.2d 1264, 1268 (8th Cir.
1978) (applying Minnesota law, NDA signed nine weeks after employment com-
menced supported by return promise to pay two years of base pay if unemploya-
ble after termination); Wainwright’s Travel Serv., Inc. v. Schmolk, 500 A.2d 476,
478 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (non-compete providing ownership interest supported
by consideration); see also Access Organics, 175 P.3d at 903 (noting in dictum that
a “salary increase or promotion” or “[a]ccess to trade secrets or other confidential
information may also suffice as a form of good consideration”); Hopper v. All Pet
Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 541 (Wyo. 1993) (holding that additional con-
sideration other than continued employment is necessary to provide considera-
tion for a post-employment promise not to compete). See generally, Robert
Unikel, Bridging the “Trade Secret” Gap, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 841, 855 n.74
(1998) (collecting cases finding both no need for additional consideration and re-
quiring additional consideration); 54A AM.JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of
Trade § 895 (2009); Ferdinand S. Tinio,Annotation, Sufficiency of Consideration
for Employee’s Covenant not to Compete, Entered Into after Inception of Employ-
ment, 51 A.L.R. 3d 825 (1973).
16. E.g., Rivendell Forest Prod., Ltd. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 824 F. Supp. 961, 968
(D.Colo. 1993) rev’d on other grounds, 28 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1994) (NDA signed
a year after employment when employer became concerned about protecting
software found to lack consideration);  Jostens, Inc. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc.,
318 N.W.2d 691, 703 (Minn. 1982) (finding that NDA signed four years after hir-
ing without a wage increase, a promotion or access to new information lacked
consideration); Access Organics, 175 P.3d at 903–04 (where at-will employee
signed agreement four months after accepting employment and one month after
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the relationship to be between the post-employment signing of the
NDA and the job benefits.  For some courts, if hindsight shows that
the NDA in fact opened the door for subsequent promotions, etc., there
will be consideration.17  For others, the raise, promotion, or other new
job benefit must be contemporaneous with the signing of the NDA.18
So there will be cases in which the NDA that serves as the foundation
of the intentional interference claim does not even rise to the level of
being a contract.
B. Contract Language: Coverage and Enforceability
There is a considerable variability in the language used in em-
ployee NDAs to describe the information prohibited from disclosure.
If the language of a particular former employee’s NDA does not cover
the kind of information sought by the lawyer, there is no possibility
that a breach of this NDA will arise out of discussions between the
lawyer and this former employee.19  A basic issue, therefore, is simply
whether the language of the NDA appears to cover the information
sought by the lawyer.  There are six categories of discoverable20 infor-
promotion, there was no consideration); Cox v. Dine-A-Mate, Inc., 501 S.E.2d 353,
356 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that keeping job was not consideration for NDA
signed three years after hiring under threat of dismissal where “plaintiff received
no change in compensation, commission, duties, nature of employment or other
consideration in exchange”); Wilmar, Inc. v. Liles, 185 S.E.2d 278, 283 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1971) (finding no consideration where profit sharing plan provided for in
covenant not to compete signed six years after employment was illusory); Labri-
ola v. Pollard Grp., Inc., 100 P.3d 791, 796 (Wash. 2004) (finding that continued
employment is not consideration for a non-compete agreement signed give years
after employment began); Envtl. Prod. Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 285 S.E.2d 889,
890–91 (W.Va. 1981) (stating that NDA signed a year after initial employment
and after all job benefits either promised or received was void for lack of
consideration).
17. E.g., Puritan-Bennett, 657 P.2d at 592 (relying both on subsequent promotions
and access to secrets as well as continued employment to find consideration when
employer threatened to fire employee unless agreement signed); Davies & Davies
Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn. 1980) (finding that ten years
of employment and an opportunity to do sales was consideration for one brother’s
non-compete agreements, when other brother who refused to sign remained at a
clerical position).
18. E.g., Access Organics, 175 P.3d at 903 (noting promotion one month before NDA
signed could not be consideration); James C. Greene Co. v. L.E. Kelley Jr., 134
S.E.2d 166, 169 (N.C. 1964) (“While the defendant from time to time received
increases in salary, the evidence fails to relate any of them to the covenant not to
compete.”).
19. E.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 911. F. Supp. 148, 154
(D. N.J. 1995) (allowing ex parte discovery of current and former employees with
NDAs when the matters defined as confidential were outside the scope of the
litigation).
20. Attorney-client privileged information is not discoverable and therefore not in-
cluded in this list.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“[p]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter.”).
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mation that a lawyer might seek from a former employee: (1) trade
secrets; (2) knowledge integral to employee skills and abilities; (3)
other confidential proprietary commercial information; (4) employer
conduct; (5) general background information; and (6) trivial informa-
tion about the employer.  Using the kind of information sought as a
focus, we can evaluate what language in an NDA might be found to
cover these different kinds of information.  To the extent NDAs will be
understood to cover these kinds of information, there remains a ques-
tion of whether the NDA will be enforceable in this context of pre-
filing investigation and post-filing informal discovery due to the im-
portant public policies served by litigation.
1. Trade Secrets
i. Contract Language
The protection of trade secrets from unauthorized disclosure is well
established in the law, even in the absence of an NDA.21  Originally
handled by tort law under a cause of action variously named breach of
a confidential or fiduciary relationship22 or disclosure/misappropria-
tion of trade secrets,23 tortious disclosure of trade secrets in most
states24 is now exclusively covered by a statutory cause of action
under the Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA).25  Coverage of trade
secrets by an employee NDA may therefore seem superfluous, but it is
important because it can serve to demonstrate that the business has
taken reasonable steps to maintain the secrecy of the information, one
of the required elements for finding a trade secret.26  Since trade
21. E.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Mower, 219 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding
that every employee has an automatic legal duty under Oregon law to protect
their employer’s trade secrets).
22. See Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. 407 F.2d
288, 293 (9th Cir. 1969) (describing the cause of action for disclosure of a trade
secret under California law as based on a protected confidential relationship
rather than on protected property); Durham v. Stand-by Labor of Georgia, 198
S.E.2d 145, 149 (Ga. 1973) (noting that confidential “information is fully protect-
able in the absence of contract if . . . disclosed without privilege, as in violation of
relationships of confidence”); Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri Sul, Inc., 494 S.W. 2d
204, 212 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (describing defendant’s disclosure as a breach of
“their fiduciary relationship”).
23. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1977).
24. Some version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been adopted in every state
except Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina and Texas.  Gale
Peterson, Trade Secret Law Update 2008: Including Restrictive Post-Employment
Covenants, 947 Practising Law Institute 799, 823–24 (2008).
25. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 (2005).
26. C. Geoffrey Weirich & Daniel P. Hart, Protecting Trade Secrets and Confidential
Information in Georgia, 60 MERCER L. R. 533, 544 (2009) (“[N]ondisclosure cove-
nants . . . can provide additional evidence that an employer took reasonable mea-
sures to safeguard the secrecy of its proprietary information, as is required to
establish trade secret status under the G[eorgia]TSA.”); accord Mower, 219 F.3d
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secrets are an extremely valuable part of a business, it would be a rare
employee NDA that did not seek to cover trade secrets, either by ex-
press use of the word “trade secrets,”27 or by other language that
courts will interpret as referring to trade secrets.28  A lawyer who
knows only that a former employee has signed an NDA, with no fur-
ther details, might well be failing to “connect-the-dots” if they as-
sumed that the NDA did not cover trade secrets.
But how easy is it for a lawyer to determine that the information
they seek would be understood as a trade secret?  The category of
trade secret has been described as “one of the most elusive and diffi-
cult concepts in the law to define.”29  A trade secret is defined under
the UTSA as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process that (i) derives independent economic value, ac-
tual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are rea-
sonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.30
It is not always the first part of the definition that creates a problem;
many pieces of information are easily categorized as a formula, pat-
tern, etc. that has actual or potential economic value when secret.31
Rather, it is the resolution of factual issues demanded by the remain-
der of the definition that creates much of the uncertainty:32 is the in-
at 1076 (finding confidentiality agreement that protected trade secrets for a lim-
ited time period waived the common-law duty once the time period had passed).
27. See, e.g., Favala v. Cumberland Eng’g Co., 17 F.3d 987, 989 (7th Cir. 1994) (“con-
fidentiality agreement . . . prohibited [employee] from divulging ‘the trade
secrets . . . of the Company’”); Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 916
(D. Nev. 2006) (“hold in strictest confidence . . . any . . . trade secret”); R.R. Don-
nelley & Sons Co. v. Fagan, 767 F.Supp. 3d 1259, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Confi-
dential information includes . . . “Trade Secrets” to the full extent of the definition
of that term under Illinois law”); Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Richter, 679 P.2d 206,
211 (Ks. 1984) (“Not to disclose . . . any information concerned with any of the
Company’s . . . trade secrets”); State Med. Oxygen & Supply, Inc. v. Am. Med.
Oxygen Co., 782 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Mont. 1989) (“employee . . . agrees not . . . to
divulge . . . any information concerning any matters affecting or relating to the
business of State Medical Supply, Inc.’s trade secrets”); Zep Mfg. Co. v.
Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 662 (Tex. App. 1992) (“Employee will
not . . . disclose . . . any trade secrets of Zep”).
28. See Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 760, 765 (Iowa
1999) (“Trade secrets would clearly fall within the definition of confidential infor-
mation” in an agreement not to disclose “any confidential information”).
29. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 288–89 (5th Cir. 1978).
30. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (2005).
31. See generally Peterson, supra note 24, at 877–79 (listing recent examples of infor-
mation found to be a trade secret).
32. See Lear Siegler, 569 F.2d at 288–89 (noting that “[t]he term ‘trade secret’ is one
of the most elusive and difficult concepts to define” and “[t]he question of whether
an item taken from an employer constitutes a ‘trade secret,’ is of the type nor-
mally resolved by a fact finder after full presentation of evidence from each side”).
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formation in fact not generally known to others,33 could the
information be easily obtained by others by means such as reverse en-
gineering,34 and has the information been subject to reasonable efforts
to maintain its secrecy beyond possible coverage by an NDA?35  Even
experts can disagree about what is “generally known.”36  Without
knowing the answers to these questions, it would not be possible for a
lawyer to be sure possible trade secret information would in fact get
trade secret protection.
An additional problem arises with regard to information that falls
on the boundary between trade secrets and knowledge integral to em-
ployee skills.37  On this boundary, there is a greater possibility that
informal pursuit of this information from a former employee is legiti-
mate because, as will be discussed below, knowledge integral to em-
ployee skills is not protected from former employee disclosure even
when covered by the language of an NDA.  At the same time, however,
the pursuit of such information will be chilled by the possibility that
the information might be found to be a trade secret or, as will be dis-
cussed below, the possibility that such information will be protected
by a broad enough NDA even if it is not a trade secret.38
33. E.g., AMP Inc. v. Fleishhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding prod-
uct information not a trade secret because it was “already known to virtually all
of AMP’s competitors and easily available from widely circulated public sources”);
Serv. Ctrs. of Chicago, Inc. v. Minogue, 535 N.E.2d 1132, 1136–37 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989) (finding no evidence to suggest customer survey and linear foot measure-
ment were not both “generally known” and “obvious”).
34. Orly Lobel, Intellectual Property and Restrictive Covenants, Legal Studies Re-
search Paper Series, No. 08-059 at 10 (August 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1226463 (“protection will not be granted to information that is public or
discernable by proper means”); e.g., AMP Inc., 823 F.2d at 1203 (“[T]he electronic
components produced were low technology commodity products which could be
easily reproduced.”).
35. E.g., Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Examination Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 453 S.E.2d 488, 493
(Ga. 1995) (finding NDAs insufficient “to ensure nondisclosure of the informa-
tion,” and denying protection of the information as a trade secret).
36. United States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623, 628–30 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (avoiding reso-
lution of the trade secret status of information in criminal prosecution for con-
spiracy to steal and attempted theft of trade secrets after expert evaluation
produced disagreement, and suggesting that there were cases in which the term
“generally known to” might be unconstitutionally vague); see also Victoria A.
Cundiff, Recent Developments in Trade Secrets Law, 616 PLI/Pat 217, 224 (2000)
(“Courts and defendants alike have grappled with the apparent imprecision of
the requirement that a trade secret must not be ‘generally known or reasonably
ascertainable’ since it does not impose an absolute standard for determining
whether information is a trade secret.”).
37. Lobel, supra note 34, at 10–11 (“defining the lines between industry know-how
and firm-specific knowledge has been an ongoing adjudicatory struggle.”).
38. See infra subsection I.B.3.a.
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ii. Public Policy
Unlike information protected by the attorney-client privilege,
which is entirely undiscoverable,39 information that has met the
heavy burden of secrecy required to qualify as a trade secret will be
discoverable as long as it is “relevant and necessary” to the litiga-
tion.40  “In most cases, the issue is not whether the information will be
disclosed but under what conditions . . . .”41  Protective orders are used
to limit the disclosure where the information is important to the case,
but loss of secrecy will damage the value of the trade secret.42  The
presence of an NDA protecting trade secrets provides no additional
basis for avoiding disclosure of relevant information during formal
discovery; indeed, an NDA that attempted this would be found to be
void as against public policy.43
Our concern, however, is the enforceability of a trade secret NDA
outside the context of formal discovery.  If the agreement is void in the
context of formal discovery, is there an argument that it is void as
against public policy in the context of informal discovery, whether pre
or post-filing?  Determining whether a contract should not be enforced
because it violates public policy requires weighing the interests in
favor of enforcement and the interests against enforcement.44  Cer-
tainly, as previously argued with regard to the litigation privilege, the
need pre-filing for relevant trade secret information to develop the
theory of the case can be significant.  However, if trade secret informa-
tion is obtained in the discovery context, the judge can protect the
owner’s property interest in the information45 by ensuring  that there
is no unnecessary disclosure and that any necessary disclosure is lim-
ited.  This is not the case in informal discovery where there is neither
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
40. 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE, & RICHARD L.
MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2043 n.2 (3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter
WRIGHT] (no absolute privilege for trade secrets); see also Becker, supra note 8, at
968 n.624 (noting that trade secrets are discoverable if relevant to case).
41. WRIGHT, supra note 40, § 2043.
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G) (providing for protective orders for trade secrets).
43. Kenneth Hoffman v. Sbarra, Inc., No. 97 CIV. 4484(SS), 1997 WL 736703, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1997) (“To the extent that the [non-disclosure] agreement
might be construed as requiring an employee to withhold evidence designed to
enforce federal statutory rights, it is void.”); see also Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v.
Hudson, No. 95-1130, 1996 WL 520789, at *8 n.2 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 1996)
(describing approvingly an uncited Georgia proceeding in which the Georgia
court found that a confidentiality agreement read to suppress witness testimony
would violate public policy).
44. E.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981)).
45. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002–3 (1984) (describing public
disclosure of trade secrets as depriving the owner of property).
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judicial supervision nor—as is often the case—any notice to the owner
that disclosure is threatened.46
Case law on enforceability of trade-secret protecting NDAs to limit
informal investigation is mixed.  In Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v.
Hudson,47 an NDA was enforced against a former employee with
trade secret information who had been hired as a litigation consultant
by plaintiffs adverse to Uniroyal48 because disclosure in this context
put the trade secret information in the “public realm,”49 which posed a
significant threat to the confidentiality and therefore trade secret sta-
tus of the information.  The court found that enforcing the agreement
by prohibiting the former employee from acting as a pre-trial consult-
ant or expert witness at trial, but allowing him to testify as a fact
witness, did not violate public policy.50  Similarly, in Saini v. Interna-
tional Game Technology,51 an NDA was enforced against a former em-
ployee who volunteered himself as an expert witness in pending
litigation against his former employer because he needed a job.52  The
harm to the employer of public disclosure of its trade secrets53 was
seen as outweighing any public interest in exposing evidence of defec-
tive gambling devices54 where the exposure was motivated by private
gain.55  While there is some suggestion in Saini that disclosures pro-
tecting health and safety might involve a public interest that would
outweigh the interest in trade secret protection during informal inves-
tigation,56 Uniroyal was a case involving public safety yet the NDA
was still enforced.57
On the other hand, some courts have refused to enforce an NDA in
cases where not only were no public safety or health interests at stake,
but no litigation was in process or yet contemplated.  Instead, it was
these disclosures that eventually triggered litigation, and the litiga-
46. Accord Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921–22 (D. Nev. 2006)
(noting that allowing former employees to disregard confidentiality obligations
without court supervision allows the former employee and adverse counsel to de-
cide what information is “legitimately confidential”).
47. No. 95-1130, 1996 WL 520789 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 1996).
48. Id. at *10 (barring the former employee from acting as an expert consultant or
witness, but indicating that he would be allowed to testify as a fact witness).
49. Id. at *9.
50. Id. at *10.
51. 434 F. Supp. 2d 913 (D. Nev. 2006).
52. Id. at 925.
53. Id. at 919.
54. Id. at 921.
55. Id. at 922–23.
56. Id. at 923; see also Jodi L. Short, Killing the Messenger: The Use of Nondisclosure
Agreements to Silence Whistleblowers, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1207, 1211 (1999) (ar-
guing that NDAs preventing disclosures relevant to public safety and health
should not be enforceable regardless of the context of the disclosure).
57. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson, No. 95-1130, 1996 WL 520789 (6th Cir.
Sept. 12, 1996).
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tion sought to protect property interests.  In Re v. Horstmann,58 an
NDA protecting trade secret information about a fuel-saving device
was not enforced despite the disclosure of the trade secret to law en-
forcement officials because it resulted in criminal charges being
filed.59  Similarly, in Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co.,60 a
breach of NDA action was dismissed when the disclosure informed a
well owner’s neighbor that the well had deviated into the neighbor’s
subsurface, and the disclosure then resulted in a successful suit by the
neighbor against the well owner.61  The public interest in disclosing
the deviation, which was either a tort or a crime depending on the well
owner’s knowledge, was found to outweigh any general interest in en-
forcing the contract.62
Thus, it appears that while a lawyer should assume that any for-
mer employee with access to trade secrets has a general duty, which
could be contractual, statutory, and/or common-law, not to disclosure
trade secret information, it is not clear that this duty would be seen as
prohibiting the disclosure of trade secret information to a lawyer in
our scenario.63  As both Uniroyal and Saini involve former employees
hired as expert consultants/witnesses, it would seem that this is a par-
ticularly risky practice.  Concern about the unnecessary loss of trade
secret property that might result from informal disclosures could also
justify broader enforceability of NDAs for any trade secret disclosure
made outside of judicial supervision; however, Re and Lochman sug-
gest that public policy interests can outweigh these concerns.  Thus,
there is a possibility that a former employee who informally disclosed
litigation-relevant trade secret information to a lawyer without pay-
ment would not be found to have breached a contract enforceable in
that context.
2. Knowledge Integral to Employee Skills and Abilities
As a result of employment, training, and ordinary experiential
learning associated with work, employees will develop skills and abili-
ties.64  Ordinarily, a lawyer may reasonably assume that information
58. 1987 WL 16710 (Del. Super.Ct. Aug. 11, 1987).
59. Id. at *2.
60. 457 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1972).
61. Id. at 854.
62. Id. at 853.  The status of this information as a trade secret or not is never dis-
cussed in the opinion, however, the disclosed information concerned the direction
and location of the well and seems like the sort of information that could be a
trade secret.
63. E.g., IBP, Inc. v. Klumpe, 101 S.W.3d 461, 476–77 (Tex. App. 2001) (finding dis-
closure of trade secrets relevant to litigation to lawyer was not a misappropria-
tion of trade secret because it was not for a commercial use).
64. E.g., Smith Oil Corp. v. Viking Chem. Co., 468 N.E.2d 797, 801 (Ill. App. 1984)
(discussing “general blending or chemistry skills or sales skills”).
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integral to these skills and abilities will not be expressly covered by
any NDA that is binding on a former employee.65  This is because the
public interest in ensuring employee mobility66 and promoting
competition and innovation through the free flow of information
and experience67 would likely make such an agreement void as
against public policy.68  Indeed, it is likely that an NDA will expressly
65. See AMP Inc. v. Fleishhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1205 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that
the law will not “force a departing employee to perform a prefrontal lobotomy on
himself or herself”); Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v.  Koch Indus., Inc., 497 F. Supp.
462, 469–70 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (protecting a former employee’s “skill and judgment”
in predicting and calculating estimates of market value); Serv. Ctrs. of Chicago,
Inc. v. Minogue, 535 N.E.2d 1132, 1135 (Ill. App. 1989) (“knowledge of estimating
costs obtained by Minogue during the course of his employment with Deliverex
came within the realm of general skills and knowledge which he was free to take
and use in later pursuits”); Pittsburgh Cut Wire Co. v. Sufrin, 38 A.2d 33, 35 (Pa.
1944) (“[a] man’s aptitude, his skill, his dexterity, his manual and mental ability,
and such other subjective knowledge as he obtains while in the course of his em-
ployment, are not the property of his employer.”). See generally Unikel, supra
note 15, at 849.
66. E.g., Lee v. Delmar, 66 So.2d 252, 255 (Fla. 1953) (“The right to work . . . [and]
earn a living . . . is an inalienable right.”); ILG Indus. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393,
396 (Ill. 1971) (noting that in a “society [that] is extremely mobile,” “the right of
an individual to follow and pursue the particular occupation for which he is best
trained is a most fundamental right”); Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Richter, 679 P.2d
206, 211 (Ks. 1984) (refusing to enforce NDA to the extent that it “would virtually
bar appellant from the practice of his profession” by covering information “far
beyond trade secrets”).
67. Lobel, supra note 34, at 11; see also, AMP Inc,, 823 F.2d at 1202 (finding a confi-
dentiality agreement covering any business information with no time or geo-
graphical limitation to be unenforceable under Illinois law as an “unreasonable
restraint[ ] on trade which unduly restrict[s] the free flow of information neces-
sary for business competition”); Puritan-Bennett, 679 P.2d at 211 (“Hiring agree-
ments which restrict communication of ideas in general, rather than purely trade
secrets, have been held unreasonable.”).
68. Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 304–05 (1998) (“Courts often find . . . agreements . . . not to
disclose any information learned on the job, unenforceable on public policy
grounds . . . because they constitute an unlawful restraint of trade.”); e.g., Pru-
dential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Baum, 629 F. Supp. 466, 469, 471 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (ap-
plying Georgia law to find an “overbroad” NDA covering “all information which
either identifies or concerns contractholders of the Company” unenforceable as
“an unfair restraint upon competition”); Minogue, 535 N.E.2d at 1133 (finding
unenforceable an NDA covering “any information or material provided to him/her
by the Company” because “Minogue is entitled to use the general skills he
learned during his employment” and this NDA amounted to a covenant not to
compete of unlimited duration); State Med. Oxygen & Supply, Inc. v. Am. Med.
Oxygen Co., 782 P.2d 1272, 1274–75  (Mont. 1989) (finding unenforceable an
NDA covering “any other information concerning the business . . . , its manner of
operation, its plans, processes, or other data without regard to whether all of the
foregoing matters will be deemed confidential, material, or important” as an un-
reasonable restriction on the exercise of a lawful profession, trade or business);
Carolina Chem. Equip. Co. v. Muckenfuss, 471 S.E.2d 721, 723–24 (S.C. Ct. App.
1996) (finding unenforceable an NDA covering “any knowledge or information
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exclude this kind of information from coverage69 to avoid this
consequence.
However, this simple assumption about most NDAs is complicated
by the fact that there is at best only a “fuzzy line delineating protect-
able trade secrets”70 from unprotectable employee expertise.  As a re-
sult, an NDA that contains language broad enough to cover employee
expertise, such as “any information about the business”71 may, if the
court finds trade secrets at the center of employee expertise, be more
expansively interpreted than might otherwise be expected under the
public policies that justify protection of trade secrets, i.e., encouraging
innovation, investment and employment, and discouraging unfair
competition,72 as well as public policies supporting the enforcement of
valid contractual agreements in general.73
In particular, if a lawyer seeks the former employee’s expert judg-
ments about the employer’s products, a mere conversation with a law-
yer can engage this expertise and the information that is part of it.  If
concerning any aspect of the business of the Corporation” because “if enforced,
would prevent Muckenfuss from using the general skills and knowledge he ac-
quired at Carolina Chemical”).
69. E.g., R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. Fagan, 767 F. Supp. 1259, 1263 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (discussing a confidentiality agreement that expressly stated that the confi-
dential information covered by the agreement “does not include ‘general skills,
knowledge and experience’ as those terms are defined under Illinois law”).
70. Lobel, supra note 34, at 10 (quoting JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, § 1.01, (2006)
(noting that courts have struggled with information such as “customer lists and
data, contract expiration dates, product costs and pricing formulas, marketing
plans, advertising methods and business strategies . . . , [and] negative know-
how”); e.g., Smith Oil Corp. v. Viking Chem. Co., 468 N.E.2d 797, 801 (Ill. App.
1984) (finding that customer information was not a trade secret and, in the ab-
sence of misappropriated documents, former employees were free to use what in-
formation they remembered).
71. E.g., Puritan-Bennett Corp., 679 P.2d at 211 (NDA covering  “any information
connected with any aspect of the Company’s business would virtually bar appel-
lant from the practice of his profession” ); Thomas v. Best Mfg. Corp., 218 S.E.2d
68, 70 (Ga. 1975) (interpreting NDA covering “any . . . other information, pertain-
ing to the business” as an attempt “[t]o restrict an employee from utilizing the
experience gained”).
72. Unikel, supra note 15, at 846.
73. E.g., Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson, No. 95-1130, 1996 WL 520789, at *10
(6th Cir. Sept. 12, 1996) (“public policy supports the enforcement of valid contrac-
tual agreements belabors the obvious”); Enter. Leasing Co. of Phoenix v. Ehmke,
3 P.3d 1064, 1071 (Az. Ct. App. 1999) (“[A] business must be afforded protection
against the wrongful appropriation of confidential information by an em-
ployee . . . to encourage innovation and invention.”); Minogue, 535 N.E.2d at 1135
(“[A]n employer who has invested time, money and effort in developing a secret
advantage should be protected from a former employee who obtains the secret
through improper means.”); 1st Am. Sys., Inc. v. Rezatto, 311 N.W.2d 51, 57 (S.D.
1981) (“[P]rotecting confidential and secret information . . . stimulates research
and development.”). See generally Unikel, supra note 15, at 846–49 (discussing
the public policies behind commercial confidentiality law).
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such inquiries are combined with a broadly written NDA binding the
former employee, there is potential for the court to find that the law-
yer induced a breach of the NDA.  As we have seen, at least two courts
have found a significant threat to trade secrets when a former em-
ployee has volunteered his services as a paid expert and “used the
knowledge and expertise gained from his employment . . . to testify
against”74 his former employer.75  However, another court in a similar
situation found the expert’s responses to questions about the former
employer’s product not to involve trade secrets covered by an NDA at
all.76
Thus, even a lawyer who understands and attempts to respect the
law’s protection of trade secrets, with or without an NDA, will run into
“jurisprudential uncertainty about the law and policy of trade
secrets”77 that makes it difficult to predict whether the information
sought will be viewed as the trade secret property of the employer or
the portable experience and expertise of the employee.  Thus, when it
comes to disclosures involving employee expertise, it may not help the
lawyer to know the language of the NDA because it will be the judicial
characterization of the disclosure that will determine whether the
NDA might be seen as breached or not.
74. Uniroyal, 1996 WL 520789, at *7, 9–10.
75. E.g., Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 916 (D. Nev. 2006) (prohibit-
ing former employee acting as paid expert in suit against employer from disclos-
ing information found to be either a trade secret or confidential information
because there is no public interest in encouraging mercenary whistleblowing in a
private contract dispute with no allegations of illegal conduct or a threat to
health or safety); see also, Patton v. Cox, 276 F.3d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 2002) (hold-
ing that, under Arizona law, “[t]he need to ensure complete and truthful testi-
mony” does not require protection for witnesses who testify voluntarily).
76. Favala v. Cumberland Eng’g Co., 17 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1994).  The former
employee in Favala was the Vice President of Product Integrity and started a
consulting business after being fired. Id. at 989.  The former employee was then
hired by a law firm suing his former employer for negligent manufacture. Id.
While the NDA in this case actually covered both “trade secrets and proprietary,
confidential, private or non-published information relating to the business, oper-
ation or financial affairs of the Company,” both the parties and the court treated
the issue as simply whether trade secrets were being disclosed. Id.; see also
Short, supra note 56, at 1228 (arguing that “the exception permitting the use of
general knowledge and skills will in many cases allow former employees to serve
as expert witnesses or in a consulting capacity, insofar as such activities involve
the offering of the individual’s informed opinion based on her accumulated gen-
eral skill and expertise”).
77. Lobel, supra note 34, at 11.
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3. Other Confidential Commercial Information
i. Contract Language and Application
Many NDAs seek to prohibit disclosure of “confidential informa-
tion”78 or “any information”79 relating to the employer’s business.  As
we have seen, confidential information will certainly be understood to
mean trade secrets.80  It can also include information, understood as
“data, technology, or know-how” that is valuable because some com-
petitors do not know it.81  Since trade secrets must not be “generally
known in the relevant trade or business,”82 one question will be
whether this information is sufficiently secret to actually be consid-
ered a trade secret.  It may be information that meets many of the
elements of the UTSA trade secret definition, including having value
to the extent the existing level of secrecy is maintained, but it also
may be known too far beyond the business to meet the stringent se-
crecy requirements of the UTSA definition.
If the information cannot be seen as a trade secret, it may be seen
as entirely unprotectable because it occupies a “theoretical and practi-
cal gap between ‘trade secrets’ and ‘general skill and knowledge.’”83
78. E.g., Favala, 17 F.3d at 989 (finding that the agreement prohibited disclosure of
“proprietary, confidential, private or non-published information relating to the
business, operation or financial affairs of the Company”); R.R. Donnelley & Sons
Co. v. Fagan, 767 F. Supp 1259, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“I will not . . . disclose,
directly or indirectly, any Confidential Information”); Revere Transducers, Inc. v.
John Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 760 (Iowa 1999) (“I will not disclose to others
at any time during my employment or thereafter any confidential information,
knowledge or data belonging to the Company.”); Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824
S.W.2d 654, 662 (Tex. App. 1992) (“Employee will not . . . disclose to any other
party any confidential information of Zep.”).
79. E.g., In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1130 (N.D.Ca.
2002) (stating that the agreement prohibited disclosure of “all information and
any idea in whatever form, tangible or intangible, whether disclosed to or learned
or developed by me, pertaining in any manner to the business of the Company”);
Saini, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 916 (construing an agreement not to disclose “any infor-
mation, manufacturing technique, process, formula, development or experimen-
tal work, work in process, business, trade secret, or any other secret or
confidential matter relating to the products, sales, or business”); Serv. Ctrs. of
Chicago, Inc. v. Minogue, 535 N.E.2d 1132, 1133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (“The Em-
ployee hereby agrees not to disclose or disseminate any information or material
provided to him/her by the Company . . . .”).
80. See supra note 28.
81. Unikel, supra note 15, at 844 (dividing confidential information into three catego-
ries: (1) information  known to substantially all persons in an industry; (2) infor-
mation known to a majority of persons in an industry; and (3) information known
to a minority of persons in an industry).
82. Unikel, supra note 15, at 869 (internal quotation mark omitted).
83. Unikel, supra note 15, at 842–43; see also Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining
For Loyalty In The Information Age: A Reconsideration Of The Role Of Substan-
tive Fairness In Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1184
(2001) (noting that the “absence of legal guidance has resulted in a free-for-all as
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This gap is not acknowledged to even exist under the two-tiered uni-
verse of information carved out for protection under the Restatements
of Torts and the UTSA.84  In this two-tiered universe, information
must either be a protected trade secret or unprotected “employee gen-
eral skill and knowledge.”85  Determining whether information is one
or the other requires a difficult decision about where “along the con-
tinuum between absolute secrecy and universal knowledge commer-
cially valuable information loses its status as a ‘trade secret’ and
becomes unprotected ‘general skill and knowledge.’”86  Some courts
require that a majority of competitors not know the information, while
other courts require only that some competitor not know the informa-
tion.87  This means that there is considerable unpredictability as to
the protected status of some confidential commercial information
under trade secret law.88
Step away from trade secret law, however, and other legal doc-
trines can be used to justify protection for a third category of informa-
tion, non-trade secret, confidential information.89  Thus, for example,
as a matter of general contract law, two parties can carve out a new
category of information not to be disclosed in an NDA.90  So, assuming
an NDA contains language broad enough to cover non-trade secret,
confidential, commercial information, the question now is whether
contractual protection of this information is supported by public
policy.
to what confidential information actually is”); Short, supra note 56, at 1226
(“[T]here are gaps in trade secret coverage that may leave a substantial portion of
an employer’s valuable business information unprotected.”).
84. Unikel, supra note 56, 867–68 (describing the First and Third Restatements of
Torts and the UTSA as embracing a two-tier classification of information as ei-
ther an always protected trade secret or a never protected general skill and
knowledge).
85. Id. at 867.
86. Id. at 869.
87. Id. at 869–70.
88. Id. at 870–71 (describing the predictability problems associated with current
“trade secret” definitions as encouraging commercial spying, discouraging invest-
ment in innovation, and increasing the costs of innovation).
89. “Confidential information” in an NDA can be attorney-client privilege or work
product information.  These kinds of confidential information are not subject to
the same problems as the commercially valuable non-trade secret information
that is the subject of this section, as they are clearly defined and protected under
evidentiary and procedural law. E.g., FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(1) (attorney-client
privilege) & (3) (work product); Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399,
403 (1998) (noting that FED. R. EVID. 501 provides an evidentiary privilege for
attorney-client communications).
90. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1978) (hold-
ing that confidential commercial information that may or may not have been
trade secrets could be protected by an NDA because, “[i]n the absence of over-
reaching, the employer and employee have the right to contract to prevent disclo-
sure of information”).
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ii. Public Policy
The question of whether public policy concerns arise by protecting
this third category of information in an NDA first returns us back to
the unacknowledged theoretical gap between trade secrets and em-
ployee expertise.  To the extent that the two-tier approach is em-
braced, and protection of less than trade secret information is viewed
as producing constraints on the use of employee expertise, there will
be a significant public policy obstacle to enforcing such agreements.91
Indeed, in a number of jurisdictions, NDAs that seek to prohibit dis-
closure of non-trade secret, confidential information are treated as the
equivalent of a covenant not to compete that interferes with employee
mobility, and will be found void in the absence of reasonable time and,
in some jurisdictions, geographic limitations.92
91. E.g., Dynamics Research Corp. v. Analytic Sci. Corp., 400 N.E.2d 1274, 1288
(Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (“a non-disclosure agreement which seeks to restrict the
employee’s right to use an alleged trade secret which is not such in fact or in law
is unenforceable as against public policy”); Heyer-Jordan & Assocs., Inc. v. Jor-
dan, 801 S.W.2d 814, 821–22 (Tenn. App. Ct. 1990) (construing words “confiden-
tial information” in agreement to mean trade secrets and finding that the actual
information involved, knowledge of customers, was not a trade secret and
threatened to cross “ ‘[a] line . . . drawn between the general skills and knowledge
of the trade and information that peculiar to the employer’s business’”) (quoting
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. g (1981)).
92. E.g., Henry Hope X-Ray Prods., Inc. v. Marron Carrel, Inc., 674 F.2d 1336, 1342
(9th Cir. 1982) (“Under Pennsylvania law, a confidentiality agreement ancillary
to the taking of employment is valid if its restrictions are ‘reasonably limited as
to duration of time and geographical extent.’”  (quoting Beneficial Fin. Co. v.
Becker, 222 A.2d 873, 875 n.3 (Pa. 1966))); Wright v. Power Indus. Consultants,
Inc., 508 S.E.2d 191, 195 (Ga. 1998) (noting that an NDA without a time limita-
tion is unenforceable to the extent it covers non-trade secret information), over-
ruled by Advance Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. Roadtrac, LLC, 551 S.E.2d 735 (Ga.
2001); Cincinnati Tool Steel Co. v. Breed, 482 N.E.2d 170, 175 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)
(ruling an agreement not to disclose “confidential information” not enforceable
because it is not limited in duration); Elec. S., Inc. v. Lewis, 385 S.E.2d 352, 355
(N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted) (“As a general rule, courts will enforce
employer-drawn restrictions on an employee’s use of ‘customer contacts’ and ‘con-
fidential information,’ “ ‘providing the covenant does not offend against the rule
that as to time . . . or as to territory it embraces it shall be no greater than is
reasonably necessary to secure the protection . . . .’ ”); 1st Am. Sys., Inc. v.
Rezatto, 311 N.W.2d 51, 59 (S.D. 1981) (remanding an NDA with a ten-year dura-
tion for a reasonableness determination, despite finding that all the confidential
information together constituted a trade secret, even though each item on its own
did not); Milprint, Inc. v. Flynn, No. 2006AP501, 2006 WL 2690249, at *2 (Wis.
Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2006) (stating that NDAs, like covenants not to compete, must
have a “reasonable time limit” and a “reasonable territorial limit”); see also Carol
M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?, 25
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 639–42 (1999) (summarizing the law in a number of
states regarding the enforceability of NDAs covering non-trade secret confiden-
tial information); Weirich & Hart, supra note 26, at 552 (noting that under Geor-
gia law “a covenant not to disclose confidential information that is not a trade
secret is void if it lacks a reasonable temporal limitation”).  New York law seems
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On the other hand, there are also a number of jurisdictions that
recognize the existence of a protectable category of non-trade secret,
confidential information93 that is based upon a common law duty of
confidentiality94 arising under agency95 or fiduciary law96 rather than
trade secret or contract law.  In these jurisdictions, protection of non-
to be unsettled as to whether a time limit is required for a confidentiality agree-
ment.  Compare the majority and the dissenting opinions in Ashland Mgmt. Inc.
v. Altair Invs. NA, LLC, 869 N.Y.S.2d 465, 471 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (“We find no
legal support for the dissent’s core position that the absence of a durational limi-
tation renders a confidentiality agreement void as a matter of law in cases where
the employee does not provide ‘unique or extraordinary’ services.”).
93. E.g., Spectrum Creations, L.P. v. Carolyn Kinder Int’l, LLC, No. SA-05-CV-750-
XR, 2008 WL 416264, at *66 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2008) (stating that protecting
valuable non-trade secret confidential information is a legitimate business inter-
est that can support a restrictive covenant); Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F.
Supp. 2d 913, 919 (D. Nev. 2006) (holding that “disclosure of non-trade secret
confidential information” creates the same kind of injury as does disclosure of
trade secrets); Jostens, Inc. v.  Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 701
(Minn. 1982) (“[e]mployees have a common-law duty not to wrongfully use confi-
dential information or trade secrets obtained from an employer”); Den-Tal-Ez,
Inc. v. Siemens Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 1224 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (noting
that “[c]ertain information protected by agreement may be protected only by
agreement, as it is considered by a business to be confidential, while not necessa-
rily qualifying as ‘trade secrets’”).
94. E.g., USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 393 N.E.2d 895, 903 (Mass. 1979)
(dictum) (“plaintiff who may not claim trade secret protection . . . because the
information, while confidential, is only ‘business information,’ may still be enti-
tled to some relief against one who improperly procures such information”);
Shwayder Chem. Metallurgy Corp. v. Baum, 206 N.W.2d 484, 487–488 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1973) (finding breach of duty arising out of confidential relationship for dis-
closure of customer and raw material source lists not found to be trade secrets);
Saliterman v. Finney, 361 N.W.2d 175, 178–79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding a
dentist “breached his common law duty not to disclose or use confidential infor-
mation gained at the expense of his employer” when he used confidential patient
lists to solicit patients for his competing dental practice). But see AMP Inc. v.
Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1201 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that under Illinois
law, an employer who relies on “common law restrictions against disclosure of
confidential information” can only get protection for “trade secrets or near-perma-
nent customer relationships”). See generally, Bast, supra note 92, at 636–37 n.42
(collecting cases holding that non-trade secret confidential information “is a pro-
tectable interest under common law principles”).
95.  See Nucor Corp. v. Tenn. Forging Steel Serv., Inc., 476 F.2d 386, 392 (8th Cir.
1973) (holding that, under Arkansas law, employees have a duty not to disclose
non-trade secret confidential information arising out of the agency relationship
between employers and employees); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F.
Supp. 254, 262 (E.D. La. 1967) (finding the agency duty not to disclose confiden-
tial information of the principal paralleled the duty created by a contract not to
disclose confidential information); Organic Chems., Inc. v. Carroll Prods., Inc.,
211 U.S.P.Q. 628, 631–632 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (holding that confidentiality agree-
ments could protect non-trade secret, confidential information because they cre-
ate a confidential, fiduciary relationship); Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v.
Eng’g Mechs. Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1114 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (using
agency liability for disclosure of non-trade secret, confidential information as a
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trade secret, confidential information is not seen as limiting the use of
employee expertise,97 and NDAs that seek to protect such confidential
information will be enforceable even in the absence of time or geo-
graphical limits.98  However, even in these favorable jurisdictions, if
the information is not confidential—because it is obvious, generally
available, or has not been subject to appropriate efforts to maintain
confidentiality99—then it will fail to fall within the contract language
at all and no breach is possible.100
If Model Rule 4.4 prohibits intentional interference with former
employee NDAs, then a lawyer must first determine if the information
sought is a trade-secret, confidential information, or employee exper-
tise, in order to determine whether it is ethical to informally seek the
information.  Determining which of these three categories of informa-
tion is involved in any particular situation is a fact-intensive determi-
nation ordinarily made by a court after reviewing a significant
justification for enforcing an NDA covering such confidential information); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958).
96. Unikel, supra note 15, at 860–62 (noting that many courts have found employees
who disclosed confidential information to be in breach of their duty of loyalty as a
fiduciary).
97. E.g., Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1978)
(“employer and employee have the right to contract to prevent disclosure of infor-
mation”); Coady v Harpo, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 244, 250 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (finding
that the “confidentiality agreement does not restrict commerce and does not re-
strict plaintiff’s ability to work in any chosen career field, at any time”).
98. E.g., Coady, 719 N.E.2d at 250 (holding that a “confidentiality agreement will not
be deemed unenforceable for lack of durational or geographic limitations where
trade secrets and confidential information are involved”); Revere Transducers,
Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 761–62 (Iowa 1999) (finding that a non-
disclosure agreement involving confidential information did not restrict employ-
ment opportunities and holding in general that NDAs do not require “geographic
or durational limitations”); Bernier, v. Merrill Air Eng’rs, 770 A.2d 97, 104 (Me.
2001) (holding that confidential, non-trade secret information may be protected
without impinging on the employee’s right to use general skill and knowledge
and that neither geographic nor temporal limitations are necessary in non-disclo-
sure agreements covering such information).
99. E.g., Spectrum Creations, L.P. v. Carolyn Kinder Int’l, LLC, No. SA-05-CV-750-
XR, 2008 WL 416264, at *72–73 (W.D. Tex. Feb 13, 2008) (finding disclosure of
information that was about or from discloser was public knowledge, or was not
shown to be valuable and confidential, and therefore, not a breach of NDA cover-
ing “valuable confidential . . . information”); Central Plastics Co. v. Godson, 537
P.2d 330, 334–35 (Okla. 1975) (finding the construction of a device obvious from
inspection and the contents of customer lists “easily ascertainable or available
generally to the public or trade”).
100. E.g., Disher v. Fulgoni, 514 N.E.2d 767, 777–79 (Ill. App. 1987) (finding agree-
ment prohibiting disclosure of confidential information did not cover information
that was not subject to “adequate security measures to protect,” was published by
the employer, or was known to other competitors independently); Eutectic Weld-
ing Alloys Corp. v. West, 160 N.W.2d 566, 570 (Minn. 1968) (finding no breach
because “ordinary sales information” was not confidential).
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quantity of evidence.101  It is not likely that a lawyer in this position
will have the facts necessary to resolve the issue.  Even with the facts,
a definitive prediction as to whether the information would be found a
trade secret, confidential information, or non-confidential information,
could often be difficult.  Trying to resolve this issue prior to informal
conversations would likely be quite expensive and not cost-effective.
Thus, while there are a number of situations in which a lawyer can
ethically seek non-trade secret commercial information, such as where
is it not covered by the language of the NDA, it is not legally protect-
able in this jurisdiction without time/geographic limits, it has not been
kept sufficiently confidential, or no tortious interference is present,
there will always be considerable uncertainty about whether a partic-
ular fact pattern falls within one of these ethical safe harbors.  Be-
cause this uncertainty creates a risk that informal investigation will
violate an ethical rule and trigger a disqualification motion, many
lawyers may be deterred from informal investigation.
Other public policy concerns are also relevant to the enforcement of
NDAs protecting non-trade secret, confidential information.  However,
it is impossible to predict when these NDAs will be unenforceable as
against public policy102 because the interests in favor of enforcement
and against enforcement must be weighed in a particular situation.103
In the context of an NDA protecting non-trade secret, confidential in-
formation, the promotion of private contracts by enforcing justified ex-
pectations will be one public policy that favors enforcement.104  In
addition, although confidential commercial information may not quite
receive the “property” protection of trade secrets, the goals of encour-
aging innovation and investment while discouraging commercial spy-
101. Lear Siegler, 569 F.2d at 288–89 (“The question of whether an item taken from an
employer constitutes a ‘trade secret,’ is of the type normally resolved by a fact
finder after full presentation of evidence from each side.”); Jostens, Inc. v. Nat’l
Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 697 (Minn. 1982) (describing the trial necessary
to resolve whether information was a trade secret as “long and complex”).
102. See Garfield, supra note 68, at 314 (“[T]he Restatement test gives courts virtually
no guidance, other than indicating that a court should begin with the presump-
tion of enforcing contracts”).
103. E.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (following the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1)).
104. Garfield, supra note 68, 298–99 (describing “the public policies that underlie con-
tracts law” as promoting private contracting by avoiding frustration of justified
expectations and avoiding the unjust enrichment that may result from non-en-
forcement after performance by one party); see also Ryan M. Philp, Silence at Our
Expense: Balancing Safety and Secrecy in Non-disclosure Agreements, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 845, 858 (2003) (describing the Restatement’s balancing test as re-
quiring that the “necessity of preserving the integrity of traditional contract law
principles” be outweighed by public policies against enforcement).
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ing105 can also be furthered by protecting this information.  Thus, we
might expect these interests will support enforcement of NDAs cover-
ing such information, but more weakly than they protect trade secrets.
On the other side of the balancing test, there are various public
policies against enforcement arising out of the litigation context of the
disclosure.  As already discussed, there is a general public policy disfa-
voring interference with trial fact-finding.106  In addition, the lawyer
will often be seeking information from the former employee that will
reveal employer wrongdoing.  As a result, the particular law claimed
to be violated by the employer will provide its own distinctive public
policy argument against enforcement of any NDA.107  This will be the
same whether the information protected is trade secret, confidential
information or, as discussed below, non-commercial information.
However, the weight given to different public interests can vary from
court to court.  Concealment of criminal activity will usually be found
to violate a particularly strong public policy that would likely result in
non-enforcement of the NDA.108  Beyond this, however, we return to a
105. See 2 MELVIN, F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 13:3, n.7 (2010) (“[C]onfidentiality
agreements are an effective tool in the maintenance of commercial morality and
in promoting invention and innovation.”).
106. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson, No. 95-1130, 1996 WL 529789, at *10 (6th
Cir. Sept. 12, 1996); see also Multiven Inc. v. Cisco Sys., No. 08-05391, 2010 WL
583955, at *3 n.4 (stating, in dictum, that “there even may be situations where
disclosure of trade secrets and truly confidential information is necessary in the
interests of justice and full and fair disclosure”); Smith v. Super. Ct., 49 Cal. Rep.
2d 20, 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (“Agreements to suppress evidence have long been
held void as against public policy, both in California and in most common law
jurisdictions.”  (quoting Williamson v Super. Ct., 582 P.2d 126, 131 (Cal. 1978)));
John E. Iole & John D Goetz, Ethics or Procedure? A Discovery-Based Approach to
Ex Parte Contacts with Former Employees of a Corporate Adversary, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 81, 124 (1992) (“Except in cases of privilege or other legitimate
protections from discovery, withholding facts never will be a legitimate interest.”
(footnote omitted)).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(3)(a) (1981) (indicating that public
policy is “manifested by legislation or judicial decisions”).  Any specific public pol-
icy would be enhanced by a general public policy in favor of disclosure of such
wrongdoing, as disclosure discourages continued violation. See Chambers v. Cap-
ital Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 441, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[A]greements obtained by
employers requiring former employees to remain silent about underlying events
leading up to disputes, or concerning potentially illegal practices when ap-
proached by others can be harmful to the public’s ability to rein in improper be-
havior, and in some contexts ability of the United States to police violations of its
laws.”); see also Stefan Ru¨tzel, Snitching for the Common Good: In Search of a
Response to the Legal Problems Posed by Environmental Whistleblowing, 14
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1–2 (“[V]iolation reporting by employees has, as ex-
amples from other areas show, the potential to dramatically increase compliance
with, and enforcement of, environmental law.”) (footnotes omitted).
108. Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850, 853 (10th Cir. 1972)
(“The criminal nature of the offense . . . gives the state a clear and separate inter-
est in voiding a contract which conceals the crime, and hampers the punishment
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considerable level of uncertainty.109  As we have seen, there are cases
and scholarly commentary that have suggested a public interest in
public safety and health should be sufficient to overcome any interests
in favor of enforcement,110 but there is no definite acceptance of this
argument by the courts.111  Concealment of other civil violations,
whether statutory or in tort, in which public health and safety is not
at stake, may also be sufficient to justify non-enforcement.112  On the
of the offender.”); McGrane v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1044, 1052
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“[T]he courts can hardly be called upon to enforce an employer-
employee exit agreement for the covering up of wrongdoing which might violate
criminal laws.”); Re v. Horstmann, 1987 WL 16710, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 11,
1987) (finding no breach of NDA when disclosure was to law enforcement officials
regarding criminally fraudulent conduct).
109. Garfield, supra note 68, at 312 (noting that “the public policy analysis [of broad
confidentiality agreements] is more challenging and more speculative” when non-
criminal wrongdoing is involved because there is insufficient law or precedent to
offer guidance to courts).
110. Bast, supra note 89, at 707 (1999) (“[I]n the hierarchy of public policies, safety
from physical harm and death ranks at or near the top.“  (quoting Green v. Ralee
Eng’g Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 356 (Ct. App. 1997))); Garfield, supra note 68, at
315 (suggesting that “[c]ourts could easily find an overriding public interest in
speech regarding tortious conduct or nontortious conduct that implicates public
health and safety”); Short, supra note 56, at 1234–35 (arguing that NDAs “should
not be used to prevent a whistleblower from informing the public about wrongdo-
ing . . . , especially . . . when that wrongdoing implicates public health and
safety”).
111. See supra note 57.
112. E.g., EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding the public
policy against sexual harassment to outweigh the public policy in favor of “volun-
tary settlement of employment discrimination claims”); Lachman, 457 F.2d at
855 (10th Cir. 1972) (refusing to enforce a confidentiality agreement when disclo-
sure revealed misappropriation of natural gas that was a tort, and would have
been criminal if done knowingly); Amari Co., Inc. v. Burgess, 546 F. Supp. 2d 571,
582–83 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (indicating in a RICO case that, in theory, confidentiality
agreements could not be used to conceal fraudulent racketeering activity, but,
denying motion to enjoin enforcement of such agreements because employer was
a non-party and no specific former employee witnesses were known to have been
chilled by a threat to enforce); EEOC v. Int’l Profit Assocs., Inc., No. 01 C 4427,
2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6761, at *2, 6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2003) (holding an agree-
ment prohibiting disclosure of “anything relating to his employment” was unen-
forceable because void as against public policy to the extent the agreement was
used to chill communication with the EEOC regarding sexual harassment
claims); In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1130, 1137
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding a broad “all information” NDA to be “in conflict with the
public policy in favor of allowing even current employees to assist in securities
fraud investigations”); EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 01 Civ. 8421, 2002
U.S. Dist. Lexis 17484, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2002) (ruling that non-assis-
tance agreements interpreted to prohibit communication with EEOC about gen-
der discrimination would violate important public policy interests); Chambers v.
Capital Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 441, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that “it is
against public policy for parties to agree not to reveal . . . facts relating to alleged
or potential violations of [federal] law” in an age discrimination case); Nestor v.
Posner-Gerstenhaber, 857 So. 2d 953, 955 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (allowing
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other hand, concealment of a breach of contract may provide only a
weak public policy against enforcement.113  Similar uncertainty exists
in the context of cases asserting a whistleblower public policy excep-
tion to termination of employment at will.  In these cases, courts have
attempted to distinguish between disclosures promoting the public
good and those that serve private interests,114 however, the distinc-
tion has proven difficult.115  Whistleblower law does not directly gov-
ern in cases involving former employees with NDAs, as former
employees cannot be fired in retaliation, but merely sued for breach of
contract.116  However, at the very least, since confidentiality agree-
ments and termination cases involve the same balancing of employer
interests and public interests, the outcomes should not differ.117
informal discovery in a will contest of parties who had signed a confidentiality
agreement covering information about the decedent’s testamentary capacity be-
cause “[c]ontractual confidentiality agreements . . . cannot be used to adversely
interfere with the ability of nonparties to pursue discovery in support of their
case”); see also Garfield, supra note 68, at 327 (arguing that agency and trade
secret law suggest that “employers have no legitimate interest in suppressing
information about their tortious conduct”).
113. See Saini, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 921 (enforcing broad “any information” agreement
breached by disclosure of trade secrets and confidential commercial information
because public interest in “uncovering the sale of defective products . . . is not as
high a priority as enforcement of sexual harassment law . . . , at least
when . . . the defect at issue is not a threat to the safety or economic well-being of
the public at large” and was counterbalanced by policies protecting trade secrets);
accord Bast, supra note 92, at 670 (noting that in most “[c]ases recognizing a
whistleblowing public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine . . . the
court requires that the information sought to be disclosed must affect public (not
private) interests of health or safety, or must concern illegal conduct”).
114. Bast, supra note 92, at 669 (“In most cases, the court requires that the informa-
tion sought to be disclosed must affect public (not private) interests of health or
safety, or must concern illegal conduct.”); e.g., McGrane v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n,
822 F. Supp. 1044, 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that under New York’s whistle
blower statute, only threats to public health and safety, and not financial impro-
prieties, are sufficient to trigger protection).
115. Bast, supra note 92, at 669 (“Courts faced with whistleblowing cases have found
this a difficult distinction to make.”).
116. Saini, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 922 (noting that whistleblowing immunity would not
have been appropriate here because the disclosure was not “public oriented,” as
the illegality reported was merely the breach of a contract between the former
employer and another company, and the former employee provided the informa-
tion for a fee because he needed the money).
117. See Bast, supra note 92, at 706 (arguing that where disclosure would, under
whistleblower law, fall under a public policy exception to employment at will,
“the same whistleblowing should be sufficient to hold a confidentiality agreement
unenforceable”); Garfield, supra note 68, at 316 (using whistleblower statutes to
argue that “the public interest in information about criminal conduct outweighs a
person’s privacy interest in suppressing such information”).
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Finally, the weight of the public policy interest against enforce-
ment is not necessarily determinative of the outcome.118  Also rele-
vant to the analysis will be the factual context of the making of the
contract and the disclosure.119  At least one case has suggested that
other factors, such as whether “the former employee is not the initiat-
ing party”120 and whether the NDA was intended from the beginning
to conceal evidence of wrongdoing,121 should take on critical impor-
tance.  Thus, since any determination that an NDA is void as against
public policy “will turn on a fact-intensive inquiry,”122 even a strong
public policy argument against enforcement faces an uncertain
response.
4. Employer Conduct, General and Trivial Information, and
Events
Trade secrets and non-trade secret, confidential information con-
tribute to commercial profit because they enjoy some level of secrecy
and have commercial value.123  The remaining three categories of in-
118. E.g., Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson, No 95-1130, 1996 WL 520789, at *10
(6th Cir. Sept. 12, 1996) (rejecting public policy arguments and enforcing an NDA
to prohibit expert testimony in case involving tire failure, but also finding that
former employee could testify as fact witness at trial); see also Garfield, supra
note 68, at 275, 294 (noting the enforcement via settlement agreement and in-
junction of an NDA involving Jefffrey Wigand, a tobacco executive who sought to
testify about the health risks of tobacco known to the tobacco companies).
119. Garfield, supra note 68, at 318 (noting that “[r]elevant contextual considerations
include not only who made the promise of silence, but also the relationship of the
parties to the contract, and how the party promising silence acquired the sup-
pressed information”).
120. Saini, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 921  (enforcing the NDA where former employee con-
tacted plaintiff in contract dispute with employer and offered his services as an
expert (quoting Chambers, 159 F.R.D at 444)). But see EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc.,
94 F.3d 778, 745 (1st Cir. 1996) (refusing to enforce a settlement agreement that
would prohibit former employees from volunteering information to the EEOC
about sexual harassment but would have allowed them to respond to EEOC
subpoenas).
121. Saini, 434 F.Supp. 2d at 921 (distinguishing between agreements settling em-
ployee harassment claims that were designed to prevent additional employer lia-
bility and an employment-related NDA designed to protect trade secrets and
confidential information); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 178(3)(d) (1981) (indicating that a more direct “connection between th[e] mis-
conduct and the term” sought to be enforced will strengthen the cases against
enforcement). But see Lachman, 457 F.2d at 852 (holding that there is no differ-
ence between an agreement that intends to conceal wrongdoing and an agree-
ment that did not so intend but which has that effect).
122. Garfield, supra note 68, at 318.
123. There may be an additional protected category of non-secret commercially valua-
ble information that is viewed as property under New York law, involving either
proprietary materials or valuable ideas. See, e.g., Frederick Chusid & Co. v. Mar-
shall Leeman & Co., 326 F. Supp. 1043, 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (finding that an
NDA could protect materials developed for a career counseling business even if
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formation are not commercial information and, as such, may not be
entitled to any legal protection.124  As a result of their employment,
former employees will have information about employer conduct.
Some examples may include whether the employer bribed foreign offi-
cials or how the employer responded to charges of sexual harassment.
Although this conduct might sometimes be the secret to a business’s
success, it is so only indirectly at best.  It is not what you sell or how
you do it, but rather what you did in running your business.125  Thus,
it could be argued it is not proprietary commercial information.  Em-
ployees also gain general information about their employers.  This in-
cludes the layout of an office they work in, who reports to whom, or
where materials are stored.  Employees can also come to know trivial
information as well, such as the boss’s taste in footwear, the brand of
the coffeepot in the kitchen, or the kind of music played at the holiday
party.  Employees are also witnesses to events involving the employer,
such as power failures, the level of floodwater in the building, or a slip
and fall on the stairs.126
no trade secret or confidentiality could be shown); Cole v. Phillips H. Lord, Inc.,
28 N.Y.S.2d 404, 409 (N.Y. App. Div. 1941) (finding idea for radio show about a
district attorney protected by contract).
124. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 1986) (find-
ing Scientology materials not trade secrets where the harm alleged from disclo-
sure was spiritual rather than commercial); Hoffman v. Sbarro, Inc., No. 97 CIV.
4484(SS), 1997 WL 736703, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1997) (suggesting that a
payroll policy would not be covered by an NDA because it was not “competition-
related information”). See generally, Short, supra note 56, at 1224 (“Courts are in
broad agreement that nondisclosure agreements, no matter how extensive their
coverage, may only be used to restrict the disclosure of trade secret and confiden-
tial information.”).
125. Accord Spectrum Creations, L.P. v. Carolyn Kinder Int’l, LLC, No. SA-05-CV-
750-XR, 2008 WL 416264, at *66 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2008) (finding the fact that a
showroom was opened and that a particular person visited it not “valuable confi-
dential or professional information that would warrant protection under Florida
law”); Mulei v. Jet Courier Serv., Inc., 739 P.2d 889, 892 (Colo. App. 1987) (“Only
confidential information acquired during the course of employment may be pro-
tected, not the general knowledge of a business operation.”), rev’d in part by, 771
P.2d 486 (Colo. 1989); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt b (1939) (noting
a trade secret “is not simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the
conduct of the business, as, for example, the amount or other terms of a secret bid
for a contract or the salary of certain employees, or the security investments
made or contemplated, or the date fixed for the announcement of a new policy or
for bringing out a new model or the like”).
126. E.g., Lott v. United States, No. C-07-3530, 2008 WL 2923437, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
July, 25, 2008) (noting no unethical behavior when a lawyer contacted a former
employee witness to an accident involving a fall from a gangway).
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i. Language
All of this information is arguably covered by an NDA that prohib-
its disclosure of “any information about the business.”127  Why do em-
ployers want to keep such information confidential when it is not
typically commercially valuable?  Certainly, they would prefer to
avoid the potential negative consequences of any wrongdoing that
might have occurred.  However, even disclosure of information about
lawful conduct, facts or events can prove embarrassing, trigger a crim-
inal or regulatory investigation, or reveal liability.  Consequently, as a
rule, employers would prefer to control all the information that might
be disclosed by current and former employees.  It is for this reason
that employers gravitate toward NDAs with the very broad “any infor-
mation” language.128
Whether or not a court will be willing to interpret any information
as including non-commercial information is an open question.  At least
one court, in the face of a quickly-abandoned claim that an any infor-
mation NDA barred testimony as to alleged criminal and fraudulent
conduct by the employer, suggested that it would refuse to interpret
the NDA so broadly.129  For some courts, any information NDAs are
unenforceable because they produce a contract so vague that the for-
mer employee has no notice of what they must not reveal.  One judge
colorfully described this language as seeming to require the “depart-
ing employee to perform a prefrontal lobotomy.”130  Many courts, on
127. E.g., Zanders v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 898 F.2d 1127, 1133 (6th Cir. 1990)
(“You also agree not to disclose to anyone any information obtained in the course
of your employment and related to the functions of your position”); Great Lakes
Carbon Corp. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 462, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding
unenforceable an NDA covering “information of any and every kind pertaining to
the existing and/or contemplated business of, and belonging to Company”); State
Med. Oxygen & Supply, Inc. v. Am. Med. Oxygen Co., 782 P.2d 1272, 1273–74
(Mont. 1989) (“the employee agrees not to divulge . . . any other information con-
cerning the business of State Medical Supply, Inc., its manner of operation, its
plans, processes, or other data without regard to whether all of the foregoing mat-
ters will be deemed confidential, material, or important”).
128. Short, supra note 56, at 1207 (noting that employers have increasingly used
NDAs to “silence whistleblowers and deprive the public of important health and
safety information”).
129. Multiven, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., No. 08-05391, 2010 WL 583955, at *3 n.4 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 16, 2010) (noting that if the NDA were to be challenged it would likely be
unenforceable because it attempts to prohibit the disclosure of non-confidential
information).
130. AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1206 (7th Cir. 1986); accord Garfield,
supra note 68, at 283–84 (noting that some NDAs may be attacked as lacking
sufficient definiteness or as vague); Short, supra note 56, at 1227 (“Courts often
strike down broad nondisclosure agreements which give no fair notice to the em-
ployee of what information cannot be disclosed.”); see also Thomas & Betts Corp.
v. Panduit Corp., No. 93 C 4017, 1999 WL 261861, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 1999)
(finding “any other information” clause in NDA unenforceable as overbroad, but
enforcing as to clause covering confidential information); Great Lakes Carbon
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the other hand, limit their evaluation of the NDA to the actual en-
forcement efforts before them, and are therefore unconcerned with a
possible absurd application of the language.131
ii. Public Policy
Any information NDAs that are not unenforceable due to lack of
consideration or vagueness and are not limited by interpretation may
still be unenforceable as against public policy.  Yet, it will always be
impossible to predict how a court will rule on this issue.  However, the
public interest in enforcing NDAs that go beyond confidential commer-
cial information is relatively weak because protecting this information
is not necessary to encourage innovation or investment and does little
to discourage commercial spying.132  Fair commercial competition
does not require protecting commercial ventures from adverse eco-
nomic consequences such as fines, recalls, and boycotts that may arise
out of such disclosures.133  Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of
enforcing such NDAs arises out of common-law notions of agency loy-
alty, which is discussed in more detail below.  As already noted, a
Corp., 497 F. Supp. at 471 (“The definition of secrets so as to include information
of every kind obtained by the employee is absurd.”).
131. E.g., Serv. Ctrs. of Chicago v. Minogue, 535 N.E. 2d 1132, 1135 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989) (considering the protectable status of particular information as trade
secrets in the context of an any information NDA); accord, United States v. Wal-
lington, 889 F.2d 573, 576–77 (5th Cir. 1989) (construing a statute to cover only
confidential information, after concluding that a literal construction of a criminal
statute that prohibited government employees from disclosing “any” employment
information would be absurd and produce a “bizarre effect.”).
132. Garfield, supra note 68, at 304 (“Contracts that suppress other information no
longer further the public policy of protecting trade secrets.”); accord In re JDS
Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (noting
that the employer was only able to assert “arguments about the validity of confi-
dentiality agreements in general” to justify blocking informal discovery of former
employees regarding non-trade secret and non-privileged information).
133. Accord General Electric Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 750 F.2d 1394,
1402 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating generally that the substantial competitive harm ex-
emption to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) disclosure does not cover “the
competitive harm that attends any embarrassing disclosure”); Pub. Citizen
Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1291 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating
with regard to the substantial competitive harm exemption to FOIA disclosure
that “ ‘[c]ompetitive harm should not be taken to mean simply any injury to com-
petitive position, as might flow from customer or employee disgruntlement or
from the embarrassing publicity attendant upon public revelations concerning,
for example, illegal or unethical payments to government officials or violations of
civil rights, environmental or safety laws’”  (quoting Mark Q.Connelly, Secrets
and Smokescreens: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Government Disclosures of
Business Data, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 207, 235–36)); see Garfield, supra note 68, at
328 (noting that although disclosure of information can cause economic harm by
subjecting an employer to liability, this is not the same as the loss of competitive
advantage sought to be avoided by protection of trade secrets and commercial
confidential information).
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strong public policy against enforcement of such agreements will al-
ways arise out of the general litigation context of this breach and pub-
lic policies of varying strength will additionally arise out of the specific
legal context of the litigation.
In contrast to the categories of trade secrets and confidential com-
mercial information, the public policy against restraining the employ-
ment opportunities of former employees also might be relevant in this
situation.  As discussed when the enforcement effort is in the context
of subsequent employment in which the former employee might use
non-trade secret information, the any information NDA is usually
seen as impinging on the former employee’s use of general knowledge
and skill in subsequent employment and accordingly void in the ab-
sence of a time limit.134  However, if a former employee is freely pro-
viding general, conduct, trivial, or event information about the former
employer to a lawyer, enforcement of an any information NDA to stop
this kind of disclosure would not have any negative effect on the for-
mer employee’s current job prospects, since neither knowledge inte-
gral to skills and abilities nor actual employment is at stake.  While
the fact that a broad NDA could impinge on future employment might
134. See supra note 92; see also, AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th
Cir. 1987) (finding all information NDA without time or geographical limitation
unenforceable as an “unreasonable restraint[ ] on trade which unduly restrict[s]
the free flow of information necessary for business competition”); Great Lakes,
497 F. Supp. at 471 (finding any information NDA without time restriction would
be void as an unreasonable interference with the employee’s future employment);
Newino, Inc. v. Peregrim Dev., Inc., No. CV020390074S, 2003 WL 21493838, at
*4 (Conn. Super Ct. June 3, 2003) (finding an NDA covering “virtually all the
information that an employee may acquire about the plaintiff’s business” unrea-
sonable because of “the effect on the employee’s ability to pursue his trade and
the effect on the public interest”); Minogue, 535 N.E.2d at 1137 (finding unen-
forceable an any information NDA that was unlimited in time); Am. Shippers
Supply Co. v. Campbell, 456 N.E.2d 1040, 1041–42, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)
(affirming refusal to issue injunction based on any information NDA when the
customer lists were neither trade secrets nor confidential information and en-
forcement would have therefore impinged “ ‘upon individual liberty of action as to
one’s trade or calling’”  (quoting Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 160 N.E.804, 806)
(Mass. 1928))); State Med. Oxygen & Supply, Inc. v. Am. Med. Oxygen Co., 782
P.2d 1272, 1275  (Mont. 1989) (finding any information NDA void because it was
not “limited in operation either as to time or place”); Carolina Chem. Equip. Co. v.
Muckenfuss, 471 S.E.2d 721, 723–24 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (finding any knowledge
NDA unenforceable in the absence of a time limit under South Carolina law). See
generally Jager, supra note 105, at n.12 (“If the agreement is not limited to confi-
dential information, but is broadly worded to limit the use of ‘any knowledge or
information’ learned during employment, courts are likely to view the agreement
as tantamount to a restrictive covenant and declare it void if it is unreasonable in
time or territory.”).  One possible exception to this is when the former employee’s
subsequent employment was as a litigation expert against the former employer,
in which case some courts find the restraint on employee mobility required non-
enforcement and others found this restraint of insufficient consequence. See
supra subsection I.B.2 and notes 74–77.
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be enough to void the NDA, a court could also find that such a broad
NDA is not void “as applied” since a “refusal to enforce the term will
[not necessarily] further th[e] policy”135 of protecting employee mobil-
ity in this situation.  Thus, it is unclear whether this policy would even
be at issue in our scenario.
iii. Agency-Based Duty of Confidentiality
As previously discussed, some jurisdictions have relied upon an
agency-based duty of confidentiality to justify duties of non-disclosure
extending beyond trade secrets.136  Case law in these jurisdictions
tends to broadly state an employee agent’s duty as ensuring the non-
disclosure of “confidential information,” without defining what kind of
confidential information counts.137  The vast majority of these cases
involve information of commercial value being used competitively by
former employees.138  Confidential information in an agency context
can also mean any information the employer simply wants to keep se-
cret and which would cause some kind of harm to the employer if re-
vealed.139  This adds an additional public policy concern that favors
the enforcement of broad NDAs: the public’s interest in ensuring a
strong duty of loyalty for employees.  However, if the NDA were to be
construed to cover anything the employer wants to keep secret, that
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(3)(b) (1981).
136. Bast, supra note 92, 637 n.42 (collecting cases finding employees have a common-
law duty of confidentiality for non-trade secret confidential information).
137. E.g., Eaton Corp. v. Giere, 971 F.2d 136, 141 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that under
Minnesota law, “employees have a common law duty not to use trade secrets or
confidential information obtained from their employer”); Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom’s
Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441, 1456 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that under Georgia law,
“an item may be considered confidential in the context of a business relationship
without rising to the level of a trade secret”); Kadant, Inc. v. Seeley Mach., Inc.,
244 F. Supp. 2d 19, 39 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Plaintiff signed the confidentiality
agreement, so if he disclosed to others or used to his own benefit ‘private informa-
tion’ . . . he is in breach of both his contract and his fiduciary duty to plaintiff,”
under New York law); Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Eng’g Mechs. Re-
search Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1114 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (stating that under
Michigan law, agency principles will protect confidential information).
138. E.g., Eaton Corp., 971 F.2d at 137 (involving transaxle technology); Structural
Dynamics, 401 F. Supp. at 1106 (involving isoparametric elements in a computer
program); Roboserve, Ltd., 940 F.2d at 1445 (involving hot-beverage vending ma-
chine); Kadant, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 24 (involving design specifications and
customer databases); Gilda Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. Bureau,
457 F. Supp. 2d 6, 9–10 (D.D.C. 2006) (explaining Exemption four from FOIA
disclosure for confidential information as limited to information causing “compet-
itive injury . . .  [which must flow] from the affirmative use of proprietary infor-
mation by competitors”).
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958) (“an agent is subject to a
duty to the principal not to use or to communicate information confidentially
given him by the principal or acquired by him during the course of or on account
of his agency . . . in competition with or to the injury of the principal”).
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would also seem to include information about employer wrongdoing.
Whether the harm that might be prevented by the disclosure of such
wrongdoing would be a sufficient counterweight to both the contract
promise and agency loyalty is unclear due to the absence of definitive
case law.140
However, it can be argued that the duty of loyalty sometimes in-
voked to justify enforcement of NDAs should not be understood to ex-
tend to evidence of wrongdoing by employers.  The fact that American
law is willing to protect the privacy of individuals means that individ-
uals have a right to limit the disclosure of both positive and negative
personal information, either with or without imposing an NDA to bind
those with access to this information.141  Thus, employees of individu-
als can have an independent duty of confidentiality covering private,
non-commercial information.  However, American law does not pro-
vide privacy rights to fictional legal entities such as corporations.142
Thus we may ask what, if any, right corporations have to limit disclo-
sure of negative information.
An interesting confluence of individual privacy and corporate confi-
dentiality arose in Coady v. Harpo, Inc.,143 in which a former em-
ployee of Oprah Winfrey’s company was enjoined from revealing any
information about Oprah or her company under a broad any informa-
tion NDA.144  In Coady, the information at stake was likely gossip or
tidbits of information about an individual who has made a commer-
cially valuable empire around her personality and life.145  As such, it
140. Id. at § 411 cmt d (stating that an agent will not be liable for breach of contract if
the failure to act is contrary to public policy).  Arguably, since a failure to main-
tain confidentiality is a breach of the agency contract, id. at § 399(a), any coun-
tervailing public policy could prevent liability for the breach of duty of loyalty.
Accord, Garfield, supra note 68, at 336–38 (arguing that employee loyalty should
not take priority over disclosure of truthful information that disparages an em-
ployer without releasing otherwise protected trade secrets or commercial confi-
dential information).
141. See Patton v. Cox, 276 F.3d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that voluntary testi-
mony at a medical license hearing did not give defendant doctor witness immu-
nity to a breach of contract claim for improperly disclosing the results of a
psychological examination); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977)
(“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized
is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is
not of legitimate concern to the public”); see also, Garfield, supra note 68, at
272–73 (“Individuals sometimes seek promises of silence to protect privacy and
reputational interests, typically when a person either learns or will learn of infor-
mation about an individual that the individual prefers to keep private.”).
142. Garfield, supra note 68, at 338–39 (“[T]he law of privacy is unlikely to support the
enforcement of contracts with business entities, because such entities are not
considered to have a right of privacy.”).
143. 719 N.E.2d 244 (1999).
144. Id.
145. See id. at 250.
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certainly fell within Oprah’s personal right of privacy.  At the same
time, it was Oprah’s corporate entity that was the party to the NDA
and brought the suit.146  While the corporation had no privacy right in
this gossip, the commercial asset of Oprah’s company is Oprah, and
information about her not known to the public can be understood as
confidential commercial information, the disclosure of which would
deprive the company of its product.
Most corporate employers have rather different assets than Oprah
Winfrey’s corporation and, as a result, likely cannot assert individual-
based privacy rights to create commercial property.147  Furthermore,
since corporations are creatures of the law and only granted existence
by the government, an argument can be made that they should expect
their affairs to be open to scrutiny.  It can be argued that there is a
special need for the government or public to have access to possible
information about corporate wrongdoing because corporations are ca-
pable of harnessing the power of many people and can therefore
achieve greater wrongdoing than any single individual.  Thus, I would
argue, legal recognition of an unlimited duty of loyalty and confidenti-
ality to corporate employers is both unsupported by privacy-based no-
tions of loyalty and opposed by the public interest in ensuring
corporate accountability.
Consequently, the agency-based duty of confidentiality that applies
to corporate employees should be limited to the commercial purposes
of such entities.148  This is the case even if the disclosure of non-com-
mercial information that is evidence of wrongdoing might subject the
corporation to negative financial consequences such as fines or dam-
age awards.149  As a result, most broad former-employee NDAs should
146. Id. at 246.
147. Accord Cundiff, supra note 36, at 228 (suggesting that “the facts of [Coady] were
unique and such a broad definition of confidential information might not be en-
forced as to more conventional businesses”).
148. Accord In re EXDS, Inc. v. Devcon Constr., Inc. No. C05-0787 PVT, 2005 WL
2043020, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2005) (stating bankrupt company cannot claim
disclosed information to be confidential under an NDA when bankruptcy removes
any possibility of commercial benefit); Bast, supra note 92, at 702 (arguing that
“[p]ublic policy should allow disclosure if the employer has no overriding legiti-
mate business justification, recognizing that the purpose of the confidentiality
agreement is to avoid unfair competition”); Garfield, supra note 68, at 322–24
(arguing that courts should look to limitations on the suppression of speech in
defamation and other tort law to find a First Amendment based public policy that
is violated when NDAs extend beyond trade secrets). But see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 cmt. d (1995) (“[I]n some circumstances an
agreement not to use information that is in the public domain may be justified by
a legitimate interest in protecting the reputation or good will of the promisee.”).
149. Accord Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3rd. Cir. 1994) (noting
that while a protective order can be made to avoid serious embarrassment to an
individual, “it may be especially difficult for a business enterprise, whose primary
measure of well-being is presumably monetizable, to argue for a protective order
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not be supported on privacy grounds.150  This would allow courts to
reject agency-based justifications for enforcing NDAs that seek to pro-
tect more than trade secrets or confidential commercial information.
However, it is not clear that courts are currently prepared to acknowl-
edge this distinction between the privacy of individuals and the prop-
erty of corporations in the context of NDAs.
iv. Court Control
Finally, some question exists as to whether informal contacts with
former employees will be permitted post-filing even when the NDA
will not be enforced.  In a few cases, courts insisted on asserting some
control over the informal investigation in order to ensure that trade
secrets and privileged information are protected.  In Chambers v. Cap-
ital Cities/ABC,151 plaintiff’s counsel, in a pending case, sought au-
thorization from the court to inform former employees that they could
safely ignore NDAs and speak with plaintiff’s counsel.152  Although
the court found the NDAs unenforceable because they would conceal
possible evidence of age discrimination, it refused to “make plaintiff’s
counsel the decision-maker concerning what confidentiality require-
ments were related to genuine trade secrets or other legitimately priv-
ileged information, and which dealt with concealment of information
relating to potential improprieties on the part of the employer.”153  In-
stead, the court held that the defendant could either choose to notify
former employees that they were free to talk to plaintiff’s counsel
about specified subjects relevant to the age discrimination case or
could take an adverse inference as to their testimony.154  However,
plaintiff’s counsel was authorized to talk to the former employees only
at deposition or at a pre-deposition interview where defense counsel
was invited and present as a silent observer.155  Similarly, the court
In re JDL Uniphase Securities Litigation,156 also refused to give plain-
tiff’s counsel free rein over former employees, but allowed ex parte in-
on this ground”  (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc. 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3rd
Cir. 1986))); ITT Telecom Prods. Corp. v. Dooley, 262 Cal. Rptr. 773, 782–83 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989) (“The personal secrets of individuals are comparable to the trade
secrets of businesses.”); see supra notes 133, 138; see also Short, supra note 56, at
232–33 (pointing out that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, protective
orders to avoid embarrassment are different for individuals and corporations,
with reputational harm for a business meaning harm to their competitive
position).
150. Accord In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1137 (N.D.Ca.
2002).
151. 159 F.R.D. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
152. Id. at 442.
153. Id. at 445.
154. Id. at 445.
155. Id. at 446.
156. 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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terviews limited to previously submitted questions that clearly did not
seek trade secrets or privileged information.157
These were both cases in which litigation was already pending and
the lawyer seeking the information sought the assistance or approval
of the court before proceeding.158  These cases do not prove that the
same court would have found unsupervised contacts made before a
complaint was filed, or made after filing without court notice, to be
unethical and grounds for disqualification in the absence of any alle-
gation that protected information was discussed.  They do, however,
indicate that lawyers take a risk of being accused of triggering the
disclosure of either trade secrets or privileged information if they en-
gage in ex parte interviews.159  However, this risk exists even in the
absence of an NDA; it is endemic to ex parte contacts with former em-
ployees.  Therefore, if courts appear to broadly enforce any informa-
tion NDAs to preclude ex parte contacts when such contacts seem to
pose a threat to trade secrets or attorney-client privileged informa-
tion, it is not clear that the NDA is really giving the court any power
or justification it did not have without the NDA.160  Not all former
employees have privileged or trade secret information, and even
where a former employee may have trade secret information, it will
not always be relevant to the litigation.  Consequently, there will be
situations in which there is no credible risk of improper disclosure of
trade secrets or privileged information as a result of ex parte contacts.
In these cases, the presence of a broad NDA need not trigger greater
court supervision or control of informal investigation.
157. Id. at 1138.
158. See id. at 1129 (ruling in response to motion to limit scope of NDAs); Chambers,
159 F.R.D. at 442 (ruling in response to a motion to authorize plaintiff’s counsel
to inform former employees that they could talk to plaintiff’s counsel without fear
of breaching NDAs).
159. E.g., Multiven, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., No. C08-05391 JW (HRL), 2010 WL 583955, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2010) (noting that after conceding the NDA would not pro-
hibit ex parte interviews of the former employee, the interviewing lawyer was
accused of getting privileged information during the ex parte interviews).
160. E.g., Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co v. Hudson, No. 9501139, 1996 WL 529789, at *2,
*10 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 1996) (affirming an NDA-based injunction against a for-
mer employee acting as an expert witness in a tire failure case prohibiting disclo-
sure as an expert witness or consultant of not only “trade secrets and confidential
and proprietary information” but also of “any information regard-
ing . . . employees, company policies, practices, procedures, documents inspection
and adjustment process and his knowledge about the . . . Plant”); Zanders v. Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 898 F.2d 1127, 1129, 1133–34 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding no
public policy violation and affirming an NDA-based injunction against former
employee that prohibited disclosure of “any information obtained in the course of
her employment” other than “in a proceeding in which Amtrak has the opportu-
nity to assert any applicable claim of privilege” against former employee possess-
ing attorney-client privileged and work product information relating to
employment discrimination).
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C. Breach and Other Fact Specific Defenses
Assuming the NDA is supported by consideration, and the contract
language both covers the information sought and is not against public
policy, it may still not serve as the basis for a claim of intentional
interference.  If, for example, the employer breached the employment
agreement with the employee, this breach may have the consequence
of discharging the employee’s contractual duties of non-disclosure.161
The availability of this defense, however, requires particular facts
that cannot be assumed to exist in any significant number of NDAs.
Similarly, other particular facts could make available other defenses,
such as fraud, which can make a contract voidable.162  As we have
already seen, however, a defense that merely made a contract voidable
rather than void might not undermine an intentional interference
claim.163  Therefore, while the presence of such facts can act as a
spoiler for the intentional interference claim, there is little to say
about these defenses in a general evaluation of NDAs, other than that
their applicability should always be considered when evaluating the
risks of a conversation with a particular former employee.
D. Privilege
Previously, this Article considered the availability of the litigation
privilege to defeat the claim that the lawyer’s conduct in obtaining
information from the former employee—covered by an NDA—was in-
tentional interference with the contract.  It is important to also con-
sider whether the litigation privilege could be available to the former
employee in a breach of contract action against such former employee
for disclosing covered information to the lawyer, and what effect this
might have on a claim of intentional interference with the contract
against the lawyer receiving the information.
One major complication in applying the litigation privilege in this
context is that the privilege functions only to protect against “actions
for damages.”164  In the tort context, elimination of liability for dam-
ages removes the only remedy and thus essentially means that no
wrongful conduct has occurred.  In the context of a breach of contract,
161. E.g., Chemtrust Indus. & Kem Mfg. Corp. v. Share Corp., Civ. A. No. H-82-1224,
1987 WL 13822, at *6 (S.D. Tex. June 19, 1987) (“It is well settled law that an
employer cannot enforce a negative covenant in a contract of employment where
it has breached the contract.”).
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1981) (“If a party’s manifestation
of assent is induced by . . . a fraudulent . . . misrepresentation . . . , the contract is
voidable by the recipient.”).
163. See supra section I.A.
164. Combustion Sys. Servs. v. Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc., No. CIV.A. 92-4228, 1993
WL 514456, *at 4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 1993) (finding that although privilege would
block a claim of damages for breach of contract to recommend a settlement in
court, it would not work to bar recission of the contract).
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however, enforcement can take the shape of either an award of dam-
ages or injunctive relief providing specific performance.  Most NDA
enforcement actions will request injunctive relief prohibiting the dis-
closure rather than asking for damages.165  Thus, a litigation privilege
that protected a witness from monetary liability for disclosing infor-
mation would not determine whether injunctive relief prohibiting the
disclosure, or prohibiting others from using the disclosed information,
was available.
The question that next arises is whether the availability of this
injunctive relief on the contract satisfies the requirement of the inten-
tional interference tort that a person be caused “not to perform the
contract.”166  Injunctive relief is more forward looking than monetary
damages, addressing the future performance of the contract rather
than the past failure to perform.  Nonetheless, as a precondition of
injunctive relief, the plaintiff must show that irreparable harm is
likely in the absence of injunctive relief.167  In the case of a contract,
the irreparable harm would naturally arise from either a threatened
or already occurring breach of the contract.  Thus, even where an in-
junction is sought, there might already be a non-performance.  This
suggests that even if the litigation privilege is available to shield a
former employee from liability for contract damages for disclosures
made outside of formal discovery, it would not automatically preclude
the possibility of finding a breach of contract leading to equitable re-
lief, which would then be sufficient to ground tort liability for the law-
yer who had induced such disclosures.
In addition, we have already seen that jurisdictions differ as to the
availability of the privilege for claims arising from pre-litigation con-
duct or informal post-filing discovery.168  In those jurisdictions that
limit the privilege to formal discovery and beyond, the litigation privi-
lege could not save a former employee who disclosed covered informa-
tion informally from a breach of contract claim.169
165. But see ITT Telecom Prods. Corp. v. Dooley, 262 Cal. Rptr. 773, 774–75 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (addressing a situation where the former employer sued former em-
ployee for damages for disclosures made as consultant to company suing former
employer in violation of NDA); Denise Rich Songs, Inc., v. Hester, No. 602639/03,
2004 WL 2563702, at *1 (N.Y. Supr. Ct. Oct. 4, 2004) (addressing a situation
where the former employer sued former employee for monetary damages for dis-
closures made in employment discrimination complaint filed in Federal court in
violation of NDA).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
167. Entergy, Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 898 (8th Cir. 2000).
168. See Strassberg, supra note 4, at 972–83; see also Dooley, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 778
(finding former employee who consulted with company considering suit against
former employer was not disqualified from claiming the privilege because he was
merely “a consultant to . . . a potential litigant”).
169. See Strassberg, supra note 4, at 980 n.237.
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Even in those jurisdictions in which the privilege does extend to
pre-litigation conduct or informal post-filing discovery, a second obsta-
cle remains: will the privilege protect against a breach of contract
claim at all?  In jurisdictions requiring a claim sounding in defama-
tion, not only would the litigation privilege not be available to the law-
yer to defend against a claim of intentional interference with
contract,170 it would likely not be available to the former employee to
defend against a claim for breach of contract.171
Even a jurisdiction that will apply the privilege to the intentional
interference tort will not necessarily apply it to a breach of contract
action.  Thus, in California, which broadly applies the privilege to al-
most all torts,172 a former employee who assisted a potential plaintiff
against his former employer as a consultant despite having signed an
NDA was privileged against a claim of misappropriation of trade
secrets, viewed as a sub-species of the breach of confidence tort.173
The employee was not, however, privileged against a claim of breach
of contract.174  It should be noted that the claim of disclosure of trade
secrets in this case may have influenced the decision to enforce the
contract, as the court found that “society’s interest in accurate judicial
proceedings . . . [did not outweigh] ITT’s property interest in informa-
tion yielding a competitive advantage and [the defendant’s] written
promise of nondisclosure.”175  Indeed, the result in this opinion has
been described as a trade secret exception to the litigation privi-
lege.176  However, subsequent California cases have gone on to sug-
170. See id. at 978 n.232.
171. Accord Patton v. Cox, 276 F.3d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that psycholo-
gist’s voluntary testimony before state medical board in alleged breach of agree-
ment not to reveal results of evaluation except as directed by court order was not
protected by witness immunity); Tulloch v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. Civ. A. H-
05-3583, 2006 WL 197009, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2006) (holding that, under
Texas law, a party to a release agreement with a confidentiality clause would not
be protected by litigation privilege for breaching the agreement by attaching a
copy of the release agreement to a complaint alleging breach of the release agree-
ment and fraudulent inducement); Cummings v. Beaton & Assocs., Inc., 618
N.E.2d 292, 306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that lawyer’s repudiation of settle-
ment to bankruptcy judge in violation of client’s contract to support settlement
before bankruptcy judge was not protected by judicial privilege).
172. Dooley, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 779 (listing the many torts to which the statutory litiga-
tion privilege has been found to apply in California).
173. Id. at 781–83.
174. Id. at 781.
175. Id. at 780.
176. Wentland v. Wass, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (describing the
result in Dooley as having been codified by the legislature in a statutory exclusion
of trade secret disclosure from the litigation privilege).
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gest that litigation disclosures of other kinds of information covered by
confidentiality agreements are not privileged.177
Nonetheless, there are jurisdictions where a broad litigation privi-
lege has been found to protect a former employee from any remedy in
a breach of contract action for disclosures relevant to the litigation.
Thus, in New York, the applicability of the litigation privilege pro-
duced a quick dismissal of a breach of contract action178 seeking both
monetary damages and injunctive relief179 against a former employee
whose statements in an employment discrimination complaint were
claimed to violate an NDA.180  In a Texas case involving the disclosure
of trade secrets by a former employee to his attorney in response to a
subpoena, the disclosure was found to be privileged in the context of a
breach of contract claim arising out of an NDA.181
E. Summary
The enforceability of an NDA will depend upon the circumstances
of its formation and performance, the information sought to be pro-
tected and disclosed, the legal and factual context of the litigation, and
177. E.g., Sanchez v. Cnty of San Bernadino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96, 105 n.3 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009) (stating in dictum that disclosure of a romantic relationship covered
by a confidentiality agreement was not statutorily privileged in an action for
breach of the contract); Wentland, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 116 (holding that state-
ments claiming previous self-dealing made in breach of settlement agreement
prohibiting disparaging comments filed in connection with action for accounting
were not privileged).
178. Denise Rich Songs, Inc., v. Hester, No. 602639/03, 2004 WL 2563702, at *3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 4, 2004) (“It has long been the law that statements made in the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged, even if purportedly made
in violation of a confidentiality agreement.”).
179. Id. at *1.
180. Id. at *5.  The NDA covered only “certain proprietary and confidential informa-
tion and competitively sensitive data and information, and Trade Secrets.” Id. at
*1 (quotation marks omitted).  Given that the disclosures complained of con-
cerned the status of the employee as employee rather than independent contrac-
tor, his compensation, and being forced to make a campaign contribution, id., it
seems likely that the NDA might not actually have covered the disclosures in
question anyway.
181. IBP, Inc. v. Klumpe, 101 S.W.3d 461, 479–80 (Tex. App. 2001) (granting sum-
mary judgment on claims that disclosure of trade secret information and docu-
ments to attorney breached NDA because disclosure was privileged, but denying
summary judgment on breach of contract claim based on employee’s taking of
documents to attorney because employee may have stolen the documents); see
also Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 344, 350 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that disparaging
pleadings were privileged against a breach of contract suit when contract con-
tained non-disparagement clause); Rain v. Rolls-Royce Corp., No. 1:07-cv-1233,
2009 WL 2591647, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 21, 2009) (finding that the Indiana Su-
preme Court would follow Texas and extend litigation privilege to litigation con-
duct alleged to be a breach of a non-disparagement contract and the damages
suffered arose from the defamatory nature of the statements).
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the availability of the litigation privilege.  As to some of these legal
variables, a lawyer will be able to make a reasonable prediction about
the enforceability of a known NDA, at least in jurisdictions with rele-
vant legal precedent.  For example, we have seen that only NDAs
formed in the midst of employment have the possibility of lacking con-
sideration, and then only in some jurisdictions.  A lawyer should be
able to get the relevant details of time of signing, promotions, raises,
etc. from the former employee to determine through legal research
whether the NDA may be unenforceable due to a lack of consideration.
To the extent that the kind of information sought has an effect on
the enforceability of an NDA, we know that a duty of confidentiality
for trade secrets can always be assumed, as it requires no contract at
all.  As to whether NDAs protecting trade secrets are enforceable in
our scenario, there are public policy arguments that can be made on
both sides.  The few existing cases differ factually from our scenario in
significant ways and cannot provide clear answers about enforceabil-
ity in even these jurisdictions.
Things are a bit more complicated for non-trade secret, confidential
information because some jurisdictions allow such information to be
protected through an NDA and others do not.  But, at least in jurisdic-
tions where there is sufficiently developed legal precedent on this is-
sue, a lawyer will be able to know what level of protection may be
available.  However, where enforceability depends on whether the in-
formation sought by the lawyer is actually either a trade secret or con-
fidential commercial information, it will be nearly impossible for a
lawyer merely attempting to determine the ethics of seeking informa-
tion from a former employee to predict which of these two categories
particular information will fall within.  This determination turns upon
facts about secrecy that may, in large part, be unknown to the former
employee and unavailable to the lawyer, or upon a difficult and unpre-
dictable judgment as to whether the information falls within the gen-
eral knowledge and expertise of the former employee.
Even if the jurisdiction both recognizes the existence of a category
of protectable, non-trade secret, confidential information and the in-
formation sought certainly falls within this category rather than gen-
eral knowledge and expertise, the language of the contract can affect
the enforceability of the NDA.  For example, in some jurisdictions, a
contract broadly drawn to cover “any information” might not be en-
forceable at all.  Where this is not a problem, other public policies may
provide a strong basis for refusing to enforce such an NDA.
Some of the strongest arguments against the enforceability of an
NDA will be available when it seeks to protect other kinds of informa-
tion, such as employer conduct, general information, and events.
First, it is an open legal question whether such information should be
protectable at all, and the answer will depend upon the jurisdiction,
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the nature of the employer, and the public interest in the particular
information sought. Even in the best of jurisdictions and with the best
facts, considerable uncertainty as to the enforceability of the NDA will
remain because the result will depend upon a balancing of conflicting
public policy interests.
Finally, litigation privilege is certainly unavailable in a number of
jurisdictions for breach of contract claims.  In all jurisdictions in which
the litigation privilege has definitely been applied to a breach of con-
tract claim, the factual context has not been a typical employer-em-
ployee NDA.182  Thus, even in these jurisdictions, there can be no
certainty of the availability of the privilege to the former employee.  In
addition, due to the enforceability of contracts by injunction, it is not
clear that the former employee’s immunity from damages for breach
via the litigation privilege will necessarily undermine a claim for in-
tentional interference against a lawyer arising out of disclosures
clearly prohibited by the NDA.
In sum, there is some ability to predict that an NDA will be en-
forceable in some jurisdictions in some factual contexts.  What is less
possible, however, is to predict that an NDA will not be enforceable,
either because it involves an open legal question in some jurisdictions,
because it depends upon facts the lawyer cannot have, or because it
depends upon a balancing of interests a lawyer cannot predict.  Thus,
while there are some circumstances in which the lawyer’s tort liability
for intentional interference will depend entirely upon the tort law is-
sues previously explored183, because there will be a breach of an en-
forceable contract, there are many cases in which uncertainty about
the enforceability and/or breach of the NDA will simply add an addi-
tional layer of uncertainty to the already complicated tort analysis.
III. IS IT UNETHICAL?
So far we have seen that a lawyer who obtained information from a
former employee with an NDA could be liable in tort for intentional
interference, but we have also seen that, with the right facts and in
jurisdictions with favorable law, liability might be avoided.  We have
also seen that, in many cases, regardless of jurisdiction, it would be
difficult to predict whether such liability would or would not attach.
In light of these findings, we can now consider whether any such in-
tentional interference with contract falls within Model Rule 4.4’s pro-
hibition against using “methods of obtaining evidence that violate the
182. In Unarco Material Handling, Inc. v. Liberato, 317 S.W.3d 227, 238 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2010), which did involve breach of an NDA, privilege was found to apply to
the tortious interference claim against the attorney.  However, since the grant of
summary judgment on the breach of NDA claim against the employee was not
appealed, it is not clear if privilege was ever asserted for the employee. Id.
183. See Strassberg, supra note 4.
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legal rights of . . .  [a third] person.”184  First, we shall consider how
judges faced with disqualification motions based on claims that such
conduct is unethical have responded.  In the absence of any discipli-
nary opinions considering intentional interference with contract as a
possible violation of Model Rule 4.4, we shall then consider whether
Model Rule 4.4 should be interpreted to cover such lawyer conduct.
A. Disqualification Cases
Most disqualification cases involving lawyer contact with former
employees involve the possibility that attorney-client privileged, work
product, or trade secret information was received through ex parte
contact.185  There are only a few disqualification cases in which the
ethical violation involved the receipt of other kinds of information
whose protection came entirely from an NDA.186  None of them di-
rectly address intentional interference with contract as a violation of
Model Rule 4.4.
184. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2009).
185. E.g., Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651, 654
(M.D. Fla. 1992) (disqualifying lawyer when information known to former em-
ployee included information relating to “strategies, theories and mental impres-
sions in this and/or substantially related litigation”); MMR/Wallace Power &
Indus., Inc. v. Thames Assocs., 764 F. Supp. 712, 725, 728 (D. Conn. 1991) (dis-
qualifying lawyer when former employee had worked for employer as a trial con-
sultant or paralegal on the same litigation); Am. Prot. Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand
Hotel, Nos. LV-82-26 HEC, LV-82-96 HEC, 1983 WL 25286, at *1 (D. Nev. Dec. 8,
1983) (disqualifying lawyer when former employee had been a vice president of
the opposing party and then a paid consultant for the same litigation, and the
court found both that “his advice, suggestions and counsel in this litigation was of
great importance to MGM” and “[h]e also was fully privy to MGM’s confidence”).
186. E.g., Kitchen v. Aristech Chem., 769 F. Supp. 254 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (finding the
only ethical violation for ex parte conversation with defendant’s former environ-
mental engineer was if engineer’s access to work product and privileged commu-
nications of defendant made him a party not to be communicated with without
the consent of defendant’s counsel); In re Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 87 S.W.3d
139 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (finding disqualification appropriate when law firm
hired helicopter manufacturer’s former Chief of Flight Safety as expert consult-
ant on helicopter crash case because she had previously worked with manufac-
turer’s counsel on legal strategy in other crash suits); see also In re Data Gen.
Corp. Antitrust Litig., 5 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 510, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21923, at
*7–9 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (refusing to lift a protective order to allow employees with
attorney-client privileged information and knowledge of trade secrets covered by
NDAs to be hired as experts against their former employer and also noting that
no one had challenged the validity of the NDAs in this case). But see Becker,
supra note 8, at 981–83 (suggesting that ethical protections for client confidences
and attorney-client privilege, legal protections for trade secrets and proprietary
information, and civil procedure protections for privileged information “portend
legitimacy for private confidentiality agreements between former employees and
employers” and could provide a basis for litigation sanctions, and further sug-
gesting that Kitchen, 769 F. Supp. 254, supported this view).
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One close case is Butler v. Biocore Medical Technologies Inc.,187
where the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s finding that a law-
yer created an “appearance of impropriety”188 by hiring a former em-
ployee of the opposing party to assist with litigation against her
former employer.189  The former employee had worked extensively
with the employer’s commercial confidential information and had
signed a confidentiality agreement presumably covering such informa-
tion.190  The district court stated that, rather than hiring a former em-
ployee to gain information about an opposing party, “an attorney
should use the discovery process.”191  However, since the former em-
ployee in this case had no access to privileged confidential information
that would “have tainted the underlying trial,” the district court re-
fused to disqualify the lawyer.192  This led the reprimanded attorney
to appeal, claiming that the absence of privileged information justify-
ing disqualification meant that there was also no ethical violation.193
The appellate court affirmed the district court’s finding of an ethical
violation, citing at least one other case in which an ethical violation
was found “based upon inducements to breach confidentiality agree-
ments independent of any privileged information regarding litiga-
tion.”194  Thus, although neither Model Rule 4.4 nor intentional
interference with contract was discussed in the opinion,195 Butler
would seem to suggest that it is unethical for a lawyer to induce a
breach of a confidentiality contract covering commercial information.
However, the persuasiveness of this holding is somewhat under-
mined because the only case cited in Butler to support the importance
187. 348 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2003).
188. Id. at 1170 (quoting KAN. SUP. CT. R. 225, Canon 9 (1987) (“A lawyer should avoid
even the appearance of impropriety.”), superseded by KAN. SUP. CT. R. 226.
189. Id. at 1172.
190. Id. at 1170.  The district court summarily concluded that the confidentiality
agreement covered various kinds of information relevant to the litigation, and
neither the Tenth Circuit or the district court appeared to consider the precise
language of the agreement in relation to the litigation relevant information she
had access to. See Biocore Med. Techs., Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 181 F.R.D. 660,
673 (D. Kan. 1998).
191. Biocore, 181 F.R.D. at 673.
192. Id. at 674; see, e.g., Camden v. Maryland, 910 F. Supp. 1115, 1123–24 (D. Md.
1996) (disqualifying attorneys because access to privileged and work-product in-
formation is prejudicial to the other side and undermines the privilege itself);
MMR/Wallace Power & Indus., Inc. v. Thames Assocs., 764 F. Supp. 712, 727 (D.
Conn. 1991) (“[G]iving Thames unrestricted access to plaintiff’s trial strategies
and tactics . . . [could] have a devastating effect on the outcome of the litigation.”).
193. Butler, 348 F.3d at 1171–72.
194. Id. at 1171, citing Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerican Rental Finance Corp, 811 F.
Supp. 651, 655 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
195. This may have been because the evidence failed to show definitively that the for-
mer employee had actually disclosed any confidential information to the lawyer
in breach of her contract. See Biocore, 181 F.R.D. at 673  (noting that the former
employee was ostensibly hired only to organize a chaotic document production).
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of the confidentiality agreement is Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerican
Rental Finance Corp.196  In Rentclub, the facts failed to show that any
confidentiality agreement was signed by the former employee197 and
did show possible disclosure of work product information by the for-
mer employee.198  The former employee, who had acted as the chief
financial officer for the employer, was found to be privy to both work
product information and business information that the Rentclub court
described as “confidential and proprietary.”199  While the inducement
to disclose work product information in Rentclub was clearly unethical
and on its own provided grounds for the disqualification,200 the signif-
icance of the disclosure of confidential commercial information is more
problematic.  The Rentclub court relied primarily on Model Rule 4.2 in
finding the lawyer’s conduct with regard to obtaining this information
to be unethical.201  However, to reach this conclusion, the court relied
on an interpretation of Model Rule 4.2 that has largely been re-
jected202—that former employees with managerial positions are rep-
resented parties under Model Rule 4.2 and cannot be contacted
without the consent of employer’s counsel.203  Now that Model Rule
4.2 is understood not to treat former employees as represented by
counsel, it cannot justify a conclusion that inducing former employees
to disclose non-trade secret, confidential information is unethical.
Had there been an NDA in Rentclub, it might have been possible to
ground the ethical violation on Model Rule 4.4, but it would require a
careful analysis to make sure that the NDA was breached and enforce-
able, and also that tort liability would attach.  Alternatively, Model
Rule 4.4 might also make this conduct unethical if this jurisdiction
would have found the employee to have an independent agency-based
duty of confidentiality that could, as described above, reasonably cover
confidential commercial information.  Even this, however, would re-
quire a determination that the information in question was commer-
cially valuable in a trade secret kind of way, rather than valuable
simply because it was evidence of wrongdoing that could create finan-
cial liability.  No such analysis was made by the Rentclub court, possi-
bly because it had already found two other simple ethical violations,
196. 811 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
197. Id. at 653–56 (detailing the facts of the former employee’s position and the confi-
dential business information he was exposed to, but failing to state that he was
subject to an NDA of any kind).
198. Id. at 654.
199. Id. at 655.
200. There was also another base for the finding of an ethical violation—the appear-
ance that the former employee was paid for factual testimony rather than expert
advice. Id.
201. Id. at 654.
202. See infra, notes 233–36 and accompanying text.
203. Rentclub, 811 F. Supp. at 658.
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inducing work product disclosures and paying a fact witness, that
were more than sufficient for disqualification.204
In Butler, of course, there was a confidentiality agreement that
could have created a duty not to disclose.  As this Article has shown, a
determination that disclosure of business information in the context of
an NDA is both a breach by the employee and tortiously induced by
the lawyer requires considerable analysis, and the result is by no
means certain.  Because the Butler court made no reference to inten-
tional interference with contract as the basis of the ethical violation, it
also failed to undertake the analysis necessary to determine whether
the lawyer’s conduct was wrongful.  For example, there was no consid-
eration of the validity and scope of the confidentiality agreement, nor
was there evidence that the lawyer either knew that the former em-
ployee was subject to a confidentiality agreement or had any reason to
suspect the possibility of such an agreement.  As a result, the legal
duty that serves as the foundation for the ethical violation was not
established.
But there was one fact in Butler, shared with all the other cases
cited by the court, including Rentclub, that could have helped show
tortious inducement by the lawyer if all the other elements had also
been met: the former employee was hired by the lawyer to assist in
litigation against the former employer.205  The district court promi-
nently included this as one of the facts contributing to the ethical vio-
lation.206  However, we have presumed for purposes of this Article
that the former employee’s conversations with the lawyer will not in-
volve monetary inducement or an employment relationship.  Thus, to
the extent the result in Butler depends primarily upon the fact that
the lawyer hired the former employee, it fails to address whether oth-
erwise inducing a breach of a confidentiality agreement would have
been found to be unethical.
A closer case may be In re: EXDS, Inc.,v. Devcon Construction,
Inc.,207 in which the lawyer obtained, merely from conversation, confi-
dential commercial (but no attorney-client privileged or trade secret)
information from a former employee with a confidentiality agree-
ment.208  After engaging in the kind of searching analysis this Article
suggests is necessary to determine the wrongfulness of such conduct,
the court concluded that there was no improper conduct by counsel
204. Id. at 655.
205. Butler, 348 F.3d at 1170; see supra, note 185 and the cases cited therein.
206. Khosrowshahi, 181 F.R.D. at 673 (“An attorney violates Canon 9 when he hires a
witness who has been exposed to substantial confidential information, to assist in
litigation against a former employer.”).
207. No. C05-0787 PVT, 2005 WL 2043020 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2005).
208. Id. at *1.
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that could be a basis for disqualification.209  It began by noting that
“[n]ot all information a business may consider confidential qualifies as
confidential with respect to those who are not signatories to a confi-
dentiality agreement.”210  The court’s careful analysis of the claimed
“confidentiality” of the information first revealed that there was a
question as to whether EXDS, Inc. still possessed the right to enforce
the confidentiality agreement after having sold virtually all of its as-
sets in bankruptcy.211  Furthermore, the court looked carefully at the
information in question to evaluate in what sense it could be viewed
as confidential and therefore protected under the agreement.212  Since
EXDS did not appear to actually treat the information as confiden-
tial,213 it was difficult for them to establish the required elements for
possible legal protection discussed above—both actual secrecy and
reasonable attempts to maintain such secrecy.214
In addition, the EXDS court also took seriously the legal require-
ment that information should have commercial value derived from its
secret or relatively secret status in order to gain legal protection as
confidential.215  The information at issue in EXDS failed in this re-
spect, as the court could not see any commercial advantage the em-
ployer could gain from such information given its unusual post-
bankruptcy position of merely distributing the assets of the bankrupt
estate and pursuing claims against third parties.216  Furthermore, the
court noted that information that might be protected in a commercial
context would not be protectable in the context of litigation in which
such information was relevant.217  This echoes our earlier discussion
of the potential unenforceability of confidentiality agreements that re-
strict access to relevant information in litigation. Finally, the court
pointed out that, when only disclosure of  “non-privileged, but com-
mercially confidential, information”218 is at issue, it was not clear how
209. Id. at *10 (“Because EXDS has not shown Defense counsel engaged in any im-
proper conduct, nor that they obtained any confidential or privileged information
from Fetzer, none of the ‘remedial’ relief requested by EXDS is warranted.”).
210. Id. at *5 n.11.
211. Id. at *5 n.10.
212. Id. at *5.
213. Id. (noting that much of the information disclosed was then freely disclosed again
by EXDS in court filings with no attempt to seal the record).
214. See supra subsection II.B.1.
215. EXDS, 2005 WL 2043020, at *6.
216. Id. at *1, *6.
217. Id. at *6 (“In the litigation context, absent a privilege, the law allows a company’s
opponent to obtain discovery of relevant information, regardless of whether it dis-
closes the company’s proprietary or trade secret information (though upon a
showing of good cause courts will enter protective orders to preclude the com-
pany’s competitors from obtaining and using the information for business
purposes).”).
218. Id. at *4 n.8.
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there is any threat to the integrity of the judicial process that might
justify disqualification.219
This limited case law suggests that as long as the former employee
is not hired by our lawyer, there is a greater likelihood that a court
considering disqualification will focus on the breach of the NDA as a
critical element in determining the presence or absence of unethical
conduct.  A careful analysis of the scope and enforceability of the NDA
may in many cases be sufficient to reveal that no ethical wrongdoing
is present.  As a result, no case appears to have found it necessary to
go on to consider the possible interference liability of a lawyer and
whether this is covered by Model Rule 4.4.
B. Should Intentional Contract Interference be Understood
to Violate Model Rule 4.4?
It is not surprising that there do not seem to be any ethics rulings
considering intentional interference with contracts in general, or
NDAs in particular, as an unethical method of obtaining evidence.
Model Rule 4.4 as a basis for disqualification is useful to lawyers;
therefore it is invoked in this context.  Disciplinary proceedings
against opposing lawyers, on the other hand, make lawyers uncom-
fortable and have little or no strategic value.  Thus, lawyers have had
little incentive to bring this issue to disciplinary authorities.  Further-
more, while the complexity of the issues involved here suggest that
asserting such a violation of Model Rule 4.4 would not necessarily be
frivolous as a basis for a motion to disqualify, it also suggests that the
underlying liability is too uncertain to provide the “knowledge” of a
rule violation necessary to trigger mandatory misconduct reporting by
another lawyer under Model Rule 8.3.220  Indeed, many lawyers might
also wonder if this conduct, a mere conversation that happens to pro-
duce a breach of contract, raises “a substantial question as to that law-
yer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects.”221
If we have no information about how such disciplinary complaints
have in fact been treated, we can ask how they should be treated.
Should lawyers, in the exercise of professional self-governance, choose
to interpret Model Rule 4.4 to include intentional interference liability
219. Id. (stating that disqualification would only be appropriate “if the facts supported
a finding that the integrity of the judicial process had been injured”); see also
Kitchen v. Aristech Chem., 769 F.Supp. 254, 258–59 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (finding
that former employee’s possible violation of a confidentiality agreement through
contact with plaintiff’s attorney had no relevance to either “opposing party’s in-
terest in a trial free from prejudice due to disclosures of confidential informa-
tion . . . or the public’s interest in the scrupulous administration of justice”).
220. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2009)
221. Id.
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as a “method[ ] of obtaining evidence that violate[s] the legal rights
of . . . a [third] person.”222  We can begin by considering the legislative
history of this clause of Model Rule 4.4.  The prohibition on the “use of
methods of obtaining evidence that violate the rights of . . . a [third]
person” was part of the Kutak Commission’s recommendation for the
original version of the Model Rules adopted to replace the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility.223  Unlike the other section of proposed
Model Rule 4.4, which addressed use of “means that have no substan-
tial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third per-
son,”224 the “methods of obtaining evidence” language was given no
cited counterpart in the Model Code.225  At least in its specific refer-
ence to gathering evidence, this was, therefore, a novel prohibition.226
The only explanation offered for “the specific reference to methods of
obtaining evidence was its relation to the lawyer’s responsibility as an
officer of the court.”227  As an integral part of court proceedings whose
purpose is to enforce and maintain respect for the law, lawyers must
ensure that their own conduct stays within legal bounds.  Not only
does due process require that only legal means be used in litigation,
but public respect for courts and the law itself depends upon limiting
lawyer conduct in this way.
While it is not hard to see how this purpose can be accomplished by
prohibiting criminal means of obtaining evidence, means that violate
civil statutes, and means involving torts like trespass or conversion,
we may well ask whether prohibiting intentional interference with
contracts is also necessary to achieve this purpose.  Stealing evidence
is a method that is wrong in itself, as is trespass or conversion.  Viola-
tion of a civil statute in this context would probably involve obtaining
statutorily protected information without the specified authorization.
This would likely mean that the lawyer engaged in some deception or
fraud to appear authorized under the statute.228  On the other hand,
222. Id. R. 4.4.
223. CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS’N, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982–2005, at
553 (2006) [hereinafter ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
224. Id. at 554.
225. Id. at 555 (citing corresponding Model Code provisions that refer only to harass-
ing conduct).
226. However, use of methods of obtaining evidence that violate the rights of third
parties would, for the most part, have already come within the general prohibi-
tion of Model Code DR 7-102(8), which prohibits a lawyer from “[k]nowingly en-
gaging in other illegal conduct” in the “representation of a client.” MODEL CODE
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(8) (2009).
227. ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 223, at 554.
228. E.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Michael B. Sandy, 546 N.W.2d 876,
878 (Wis. 1996) (discussing an attorney who obtained complaining minor’s confi-
dential court file to defend his criminal client, alleged to have sexually assaulted
the minor, by misrepresenting himself as minor’s attorney); see supra note 17 and
the cases cited therein.
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it is difficult to see how public respect for lawyers, the courts or the
law would be negatively affected by allowing lawyers to do something
which looks on its face exactly like what lawyers always do—ask peo-
ple questions—with the only difference being the presence of an invisi-
ble contract.  The conduct in question has no facial appearance of
illegality or lack of respect for the law.  Indeed, the ordinariness of the
conduct involved, mere conversation, might itself suggest that this
was not what the Commission had in mind when it prohibited “meth-
ods of obtaining evidence that violate legal right[s].”229 In fact, we
have seen that, in some states, such an informal conversation with a
lawyer will be protected by litigation privilege from all tort liability,
including intentional interference.  It seems unlikely that conduct
could simultaneously be reasonably understood as privileged, yet
found inconsistent with a lawyer’s role as officer of the court.
In addition, given the importance of informal fact investigation to
effective client representation,230 it ought not be constrained by em-
ployer decisions to unilaterally impose NDAs on employees at the
point of hiring or firing.
Indeed, the importance of informal investigation of former employ-
ees has already had an impact on our understanding of what is and is
not ethical under the Model Rules.  The Model Rule 4.2231 prohibition
of ex parte contact with represented persons was initially interpreted
by some courts to forbid ex parte contacts with former as well as cur-
rent employees of a represented employer.232  However, noting the
“inhibit[ing effect of such an interpretation on] the acquisition of infor-
mation about one’s case,”233 the ABA refused to interpret Model Rule
4.2 so broadly.  Through both its formal opinion process,234 and later
229. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2009).
230. E.g., Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating
that restrictions on informal ex-parte interviewing of witnesses “not only impair
the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel but are contrary to time-
honored and decision-honored principles, namely, that counsel for all parties
have a right to interview an adverse party’s witnesses (the witness willing) in
private, without the presence or consent of opposing counsel and without a tran-
script being made”); Bryant v. Yorktowne Cabinetry, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 2d 948,
953 (W.D. Va 2008) (“[R]equiring discovery of former employees only through for-
mal means will needlessly raise the cost of litigating . . . .”);  Terra Int’l, Inc. v.
Miss. Chem. Corp., 913 F. Supp. 1306, 1314 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (“Requiring formal
discovery methods rather than informal ex parte contacts as the only means of
obtaining information would have a deleterious effect on the time and expense
necessary to pursue litigation.”).
231. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009).
232.  See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991)
[hereinafter Formal Op. 91-359] (discussing contact with former employee of ad-
verse corporate party and collecting cases holding that former employees were
covered by Model Rule 4.2).
233. Id.
234. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-1\NEB102.txt unknown Seq: 50 30-AUG-11 12:41
190 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:141
in an addition to the comments to Model Rule 4.2,235 the ABA has
made clear that ex parte contacts with former employees are not off-
limits.  Most jurisdictions adopting the Model Rules have also followed
this ABA interpretation,236 recognizing the importance of the fact
finding it makes possible.  The only concern expressed by the ABA was
that such ex parte contacts not be used to obtain attorney-client privi-
leged information from former employees and it referenced Model
Rule 4.4 as prohibiting this.237  To the extent that protection of privi-
leged information is an additional target of the “methods of obtaining
evidence” section of Model Rule 4.4, it is not furthered by making in-
tentional interference with contract liability an ethical violation.
Similar concerns about the prejudice to employer litigants of ex
parte disclosure of work product and trade secret information have led
to court-imposed prohibitions on possible attempts to obtain work
product and trade secret information outside of formal discovery,
where access can either be limited as required by law or protected as
needed.238  However, the absence of any such prejudice from the ex
parte disclosure of information that is neither attorney-client privi-
leged, work product, or trade secret provides an additional basis for
excluding intentional interference from Model Rule 4.4.  There can be
no limit during formal discovery to access to non-privileged, non-work
product, and non-trade secret information, even when an NDA covers
235. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2009) (“Consent of the organiza-
tion’s lawyer is not required for communication with a former constituent.”).
236. See DENNIS P. DUFFY, SELECTED ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM ISSUES IN LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES, SM027 ALI-ABA 797, 904 n.147 (2006) (collecting
thirty-six cases finding ex parte contact with former employees permissible).
237. Formal Op. 91-359, supra note 232 (“With respect to any unrepresented former
employee, of course, the potentially-communicating adversary attorney must be
careful not to seek to induce the former employee to violate the privilege attach-
ing to attorney-client communications to the extent his or her communications as
a former employee with his or her former employer’s counsel are protected by the
privilege (a privilege not belonging to or for the benefit of the former employee, by
the former employer). Such an attempt could violate Rule 4.4.”).
238. See supra note 160 and the cases cited therein (providing protection for work
product and trade secret information outside of formal discovery); see also In re
EXDS, Inc. v. Devcon Constr., Inc. No. C05-0787 PVT, 2005 WL 2043020, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2005) (“While the court is unaware of any case in which a
court disqualified counsel based on counsel having obtained non-privileged, but
commercially confidential, information from an opposing party’s former em-
ployee, such a result might be appropriate if the facts supported a finding that
the integrity of the judicial process had been injured.”); In re Data Gen. Corp.
Antitrust Litig., 5 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 510, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21923, at *4–5
(N.D. Cal. 1986) (noting that defendant was “not free, however, to raid plaintiffs’
roster of former employees where those employees, during their tenure, have be-
come privy to matters protected by the attorney-client or work-product privilege
or which are subject to employee agreements protecting Fairchild’s trade
secrets”).
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such information.239  If subsequent access to such information creates
no prejudice, then there is also no possible prejudice arising out of ear-
lier access to this information through informal investigation.240  This
lack of any taint on the trial is precisely why no court has been willing
to actually disqualify a lawyer for obtaining such information in ad-
vance of discovery.241
Of course, disqualification and ethical violation are not co-exten-
sive.242  Often this is because a court considering disqualification will
factor in the hardship to the client of losing their lawyer in the litiga-
tion,243 despite the fact that any such hardship is ethically irrele-
vant.244  However, the reason there was no disqualification in Butler
was not because of concerns about the hardship to the client.  Rather,
the focus was on the presence or absence of taint to the trial.245  Con-
duct that taints a trial is certainly an ethical concern as well, but ab-
239. E.g., Kenneth Hoffman v. Sbarra, Inc., No. 97CIV 4484(SS), 1997 WL 736703, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1997) (“To the extent that the [non-disclosure] agreement
might be construed as requiring an employee to withhold evidence . . . designed to
enforce federal statutory rights, it is void.”); Nestor v. Posner-Gerstenhaber, 857
So. 2d 953, 955 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that confidentiality agreements
“cannot be used to adversely interfere with the ability of nonparties to pursue
discovery in support of their case”); see also Smith v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 20, 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that “[a]greements to suppress evi-
dence have long been held void as against public policy, both in California and in
most common law jurisdictions” in refusing to give effect to a Michigan injunction
barring a former employee expert witness who had entered into a settlement
agreement agreeing not to voluntarily disclose employer trade secrets or testify
as any kind of witness (quoting Williamson v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 829,
836–37 (1978))).
240. Nestor, 857 So. 2d at 955 (noting that confidentiality agreements cannot block
“informal ex parte interviews with former employees”).
241. E.g., Barron Builders & Mgmt. Co. v. J & A Air Conditioning & Refrigeration,
Inc., No. CIV. A. 96-2921, 1997 WL 685352, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 1997) (finding
“no impermissible ex parte communication” when attorneys obtained information
that was neither “proprietary” nor attorney-client privileged from former em-
ployee); Davidson Supply Co. v. P.P.E. Inc., 986 F. Supp. 956, 959 (D. Md. 1997)
(denying a motion to disqualify counsel for ex parte contact with a former em-
ployee who provided evidence of the employer’s conduct violating federal statutes
that did not involve either trade secrets or attorney-client privileged informa-
tion); see also supra section II.A (discussing Butler and EXDS).
242. E.g., Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc., 348 F.3d 1163, 1170 (10th Cir. 2003)
(finding an appearance of impropriety despite lack of taint necessary for
disqualification).
243. Meat Price Investigators Ass’n v. Spencer Foods, Inc., 572 F.2d 163, 165 (8th Cir.
1978) (“In determining whether an attorney should be disqualified . . . three com-
peting interests must be balanced: (1) the client’s interest in being represented by
counsel of its choice; (2) the opposing party’s interest in a trial free from prejudice
due to disclosures of confidential information; and (3) the public’s interest in the
scrupulous administration of justice.”).
244. Thus, a conflict of interest, which is clearly unethical, will not necessarily result
in disqualification, if the hardship to the client outweighs the prejudice.
245. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 181 F.R.D. 660, 674 (D. Kan. 1998).
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sent such taint, our only ethical concern must be to avoid any inherent
illegality in the obtaining of the evidence that displays disrespect for
the law.  Therefore, it is only the “officer of the court” justification that
can be relevant to the ethical legitimacy or illegitimacy of inducing a
breach of an NDA to obtain information that will be freely discovera-
ble in formal discovery.
However, intentional interference with such contracts fails to dis-
play blatant disrespect for the law.  In part, this is the case because
we have difficulty determining whether this conduct is even tortious.
As this Article has shown,246 the inchoate nature of this tort, the uni-
queness of lawyer interference relative to existing case law, the varia-
bility of standards of knowledge and litigation privilege across
jurisdictions, and the problematic enforceability of the contracts in
question all combine to create a legal rabbit hole from which it is diffi-
cult to emerge with a clear sense of underlying tort liability.  This in
turn creates uncertainty about the ethics of such conduct.  However,
as one court has stated with regard to ethical prohibitions, “[l]awyers
need to know where the electrified third rail lies.”247
A similar uncertainty caused the ABA to change its position on the
ethics of another method of obtaining evidence: the secret recording of
telephone calls.  Initially, in 1974, the ABA found this to be an unethi-
cal practice248 because it was deceptive.249  At that time, the legal sta-
tus of such recording was less clear, with state, federal and regulatory
law in some conflict.250  The initial conclusion of the ABA was that
even if the conduct was legal, it could well be unethical.251  Twenty-
seven years later, most states had legalized the practice, and more
people were engaging in it.252  It had also become clear that secret
recordings were a “legitimate and necessary activity”253 in a number
of civil and criminal law enforcement contexts.  As a result, it began to
246. See generally Strassberg, supra note 4.
247. Bryant v. Yorktown Cabinetry, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 2d 948, 953 (W.D. Va. 2008)
(discussing lawyers’ need for “clear guidance” on ethical matters in general in
light of a lack of consensus on whether former employees could be contacted ex
parte).
248. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974) (stating
that recording of conversations without the knowledge of all parties is unethical,
except perhaps as done by law enforcement officials).
249. Id.
250. Id. at n1 (detailing state laws, federal law and FCC regulations applicable to se-
cret recordings).
251. Id.
252. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001) (decid-
ing that the variable legality of non-consensual recordings across the states, dis-
agreements about the deceptiveness of such recordings, and the importance of
such recordings in many circumstances required the ABA to rescind its blanket
prohibition on such calls except where it is a clear criminal offense or otherwise
violates an ethical rule).
253. Id.
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seem less and less deceptive to engage in this conduct.254  In many
states, ethics opinions concluded that such recording was not unethi-
cal, either in general or in specified situations.255  In lifting its blanket
prohibition on such recording, the ABA stated, “[a] degree of uncer-
tainty is common in the application of rules of ethics, but an ethical
prohibition that is qualified by so many varying exceptions and such
frequent disagreement as to the viability of the rule as a basis for pro-
fessional discipline, is highly troubling.”256
So, in 2001, the ABA had to decide whether, now in the face of clear
legality, the practice of secret recording was still deceptive, and there-
fore, unethical.  It was the disagreement about the deceptiveness of
the conduct that was the problem.  In the face of this uncertainty, and
the evidentiary value of secret recordings, the ABA concluded that the
practice, if legal, was not unethical.257
In the case of intentional interference, as is still the case with se-
cret recordings, it may be illegal in some jurisdictions and not in
others.  However, unlike secret recordings, there may be no reasona-
ble way to determine which jurisdictions would definitely make it a
tort.  So the uncertainty lies in the issue of illegality.  Aside from its
possible status as a tort, there is no other way this conduct can be seen
as wrongful under the Model Rules, as there need not be any deception
or other wrongful conduct involved.  In two important ways, therefore,
the situation of intentional interference in all jurisdictions can be com-
pared to the situation of secret recordings in 2001 in the jurisdictions
in which it was legal.  First, there is only one possible basis for finding
the conduct unethical (tort liability) and that is subject to a very high
degree of uncertainty and disagreement.  This is inconsistent with a
significant purpose of the movement from the Canons of Professional
Ethics and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility to the Model
Rules, which was to produce more—rather than less—certainty, espe-
cially about ethical prohibitions.258  Second, there is a great deal of
law/rights enforcement value in being able to freely question former
employees about non-privileged, non-work product, and non-trade se-
cret information.  Therefore, since the ABA concluded that legal secret
recording was not unethical because of both the evidentiary value of
the practice and uncertainty about its wrongfulness, it also makes
sense to exclude intentional interference with contract from the
254. Id. (“[I]t is questionable whether anyone today justifiably relies on an expectation
that a conversation is not being recorded by the other party . . . .”).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Irma S. Russell, The Evolving Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Costs of
Indeterminancy and Certainty, 2008 Journal of Professional Lawyer 137, 1 avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1357609 (noting that the rules “emphasize[ ]
clear notice and due process).
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“methods of obtaining evidence” intended to be included in Model
Rule 4.4.
If this were done, it would mean that even in a jurisdiction in
which a lawyer would be liable for such intentional interference, it
would not be unethical for that lawyer to engage in this conduct.
Given our usual practice of “piggy-backing” ethics on the law, this
would be an unusual result, and we would lose the warning function of
the ethical rules regarding potential legal liability.259  However,
piggy-backing ethics on the law allows courts, juries, and legislators—
rather than lawyers—to define the ethical contours of legal practice.
While this may not be a problem most of the time, it may be important
for lawyers to be more active in defining their role in situations in
which there is not clear agreement.  If we believe informal fact investi-
gation ought not to be constrained by employers trying to hide wrong-
doing, if the litigation privilege ought to cover this tort, then we can
take a position on this through our ethics rules.  This may in turn
have an effect on the legal analysis of such conduct; in particular,
whether the interference in question is “improper.”  Thus, we can at-
tempt to shape the law as it develops in this area, rather than simply
wait for each jurisdiction to take up the question.
Finally, even if intentional interference with contract were not
clearly excluded from Model Rule 4.4, we could more directly deal with
the chilling effect of disqualification or threats of disqualification for
this conduct.  If, as a matter of law, it were clear that disqualification
is not available for intentional interference with contract that does not
seek privileged, work product, or irrelevant trade secret information
due to the lack of prejudice, then the strategic use of NDAs for motions
to disqualify would be largely eliminated.  Alternatively, if neither an
ethical violation nor disqualification could be found in the absence of
clear intentional interference liability in the jurisdiction in ques-
tion,260 this would remove much of the strategic value of disqualifica-
tion motions in this context by making them considerably more
expensive to pursue and less likely to succeed.  However, this assumes
that there will continue to be no legal clarification of the application of
259. But see id. at 20 (arguing that when to achieve certainty, the Model Rules provide
clear ethical permission in the face of uncertain common law legal liability, law-
yers not only run the risk of liability, but also lose sight of the normative consid-
erations that are developed in the common law).  However, in this case, the
increased certainty in the Model Rules would be the result of taking a normative
stand, thus the latter concern of Professor Russell would not be present.
260. E.g., In re EXDS, Inc. v. Devcon Constr., Inc. No. C05-0787 PVT, 2005 WL
2043020 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2005); accord Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. v. Soros, No.
08 Civ. 5901(JFK), 2009 WL 1321695, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2009) (noting in a
case seeking disqualification due to the attorney’s violation of a confidential set-
tlement agreement, that “the Second Circuit requires a high standard of proof on
the part of the party seeking to disqualify an opposing party’s counsel” (quoting
Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1992))).
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the intentional interference tort to lawyers who “induce” breach of
NDAs during informal fact investigation, due primarily to a lack of
interest in pursuing such claims against lawyers.  Should this change,
however, the only way to have an impact on such legal liability is to
make it clear that the legal profession does not find such conduct in-
consistent with our role as officers of the court.
